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Director
Climate change represents one of the greatest challenges 
but also an inordinate opportunity to catalyse a transition 
to a low carbon, resource-efficient Green Economy. 
This report informs Governments and the wider 
community on how far a response to climate change has 
progressed over the past 12 months, and thus how far 
the world is on track to meet wider goals. 
The pledges associated with the Copenhagen Accord 
of 2009 are the point of departure for this report. 
What might be achieved in terms of limiting a global 
temperature rise to 2° C or less in the twenty-first century 
and in terms of setting the stage for a Green Economy? 
And what remains to be done—what is the gap between 
scientific reality and the current level of ambition of 
nations? The analysis focuses on where global emissions 
need to be in around 10 years time to be in line with 
what the science says is consistent with the 2° C or 
1.5° C limits, and where we expect to be as a result of 
the pledges. 
If the highest ambitions of all countries associated 
with the Copenhagen Accord are implemented and 
supported, annual emissions of greenhouse gases could 
be cut, on average, by around 7 gigatons (Gt) of CO2 
equivalent by 2020. 
Without this action, it is likely that a business-as-usual 
scenario would see emissions rise to an average of 
around 56 Gt of CO2 equivalent by around 2020. Cuts 
in annual emissions to around 49 Gt of CO2 equivalent 
would still however leave a gap of around 5 Gt compared 
with where we need to be—a gap equal to the total 
emissions of the world’s cars, buses and trucks in 2005. 
That is because the experts estimate that emissions need 
to be around 44 Gt of CO2 equivalent by 2020 to have a 
likely chance of pegging temperatures to 2° C or less. 
However, if only the lowest ambition pledges are 
implemented, and if no clear rules are set in the 
negotiations, emissions could be around 53 Gt of CO2 
equivalent in 2020—not that different from business as 
usual—so the rules set in the negotiations clearly matter. 
This report, the result of an unprecedented partnership 
between UNEP and individuals from 25 leading research 
centres, underlines the complexity of various scenarios. 
The Emissions Gap Report emphasizes that tackling 
climate change is still manageable, if leadership is shown. 
In Cancun action on financing, mitigation and adaptation 
need to mature and move forward—supported perhaps 
by action on non-CO2 pollutants such as methane from 
rubbish tips to black carbon emissions. 
Above all, Cancun must demonstrate to society as a 
whole that Governments understand the gaps left by 
Copenhagen. But at the same time remain committed 
to counter climate change while meeting wider 
development goals.
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Glossary
Annex I Target For the purpose of this report, the quantified economy-wide emission reduction 
targets submitted by UNFCCC Annex I countries to the Copenhagen Accord’s 
Appendix I.
Conditional Pledge Pledges made by some countries that are contingent on the ability of national 
legislatures to enact the necessary laws, ambitious action from other countries, 
realization of finance and technical support, or other factors.
Copenhagen Accord The 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC took note of this agreement in 
Copenhagen, Denmark in December 2009. The Accord includes two appendices 
listing Annex I and non-Annex I pledges, which are analysed in this report.
Cumulative Emissions Sum of annual global greenhouse gas emissions over a period of time. Because 
many greenhouse gases persist in the atmosphere for a long time, cumulative 
emissions greatly influence concentrations and therefore temperature.
Double Counting In the context of this report, double counting refers to a situation in which the 
same emission reductions are counted towards meeting two countries’ pledges.
Emission Pathway The trajectory of annual global greenhouse gas emissions over time.
Energy and Industry CO2 
Emissions
CO2 emissions from the energy and industry sectors. These are often referred to 
in this report when describing emission reduction rates and negative emissions
Feasible Rates of Emission 
Reduction
The average annual rate of emission reductions assumed feasible given 
assumptions about technological development, economic costs, and/or socio-
political factors.
Global (total) Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions
Emissions from all sectors and all greenhouse gases
Integrated Assessment 
Models
Models of climate change that seek to combine knowledge from multiple 
disciplines in formal integrated representations. As such they describe the full 
chain of climate change, including relevant linkages and feedbacks between 
socio-economic and biophysical processes.
Likely Chance A greater than 66 per cent likelihood. Used to convey the probabilities of meeting 
temperature limits.
Lenient LULUCF Credits Credits given for carbon removals from existing forests or other sinks that would 
have occurred without policy intervention.
Lenient Rules Pledge cases with maximum Annex I “lenient LULUCF credits” and surplus 
emissions units. 
Medium Chance A 50 to 66 per cent likelihood. Used to convey the probabilities of meeting 
temperature limits.
Negative Emissions Either globally or for a particular sector, the emissions that could occur if, in a 
given period, the removal of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere as a result of 
anthropogenic activities is greater than the addition of anthropogenic emissions 
into it.. Note that in this report negative energy and industry CO2 emissions are 
often mentioned.
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Non-Annex I Action For the purpose of this report, those emission reduction actions submitted to 
the UNFCCC by non-Annex I countries and listed in the Copenhagen Accord’s 
Appendix II.
Offsets A general term referring to credits that offset the need to reduce emissions 
elsewhere. 
Overshoot Pathway An emission pathway wherein a selected target (concentration or temperature) is 
exceeded for a period of time, but is eventually met.
Pledge For the purpose of this report, pledges include Annex I targets and non-Annex I 
actions as included in Appendix I and Appendix II, respectively, to the Copenhagen 
Accord.
Scenario A description of how the future may unfold based on ‘if-then’ propositions. A 
scenario in the context of this report consists typically of a representation of 
an initial socio-economic situation and a description of the key driving forces 
and future changes in emissions, temperature or other climate change-related 
variables. 
Strict Rules Pledge cases in which the impact of “lenient LULUCF credits” (see definition 
above) and surplus emissions units are set to zero.
Stylized Pathways These are results from carbon cycle and climate models that are designed to 
better understand the relationships between emissions and temperatures, but 
do not explicitly incorporate assumptions about technological, economic or 
socio-political feasibility of emission reductions.
Surplus Emission Units After the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012), according to 
Article 3, paragraph 13, Parties holding emission units not required for compliance 
with their commitments are able to carry over these units for future use or sale. 
These are called “surplus emission units”. There is also the possibility that new 
surplus emission units will be created in the second commitment period, when 
targets are set below business-as-usual expectations.
Temperature Limits Targets for maximum global average temperature increase above pre-industrial 
levels.
20th-80th percentile range Results that fall within the 20-80 per cent range of the frequency distribution of 
results in this assessment.
Unconditional Pledges Pledges made by countries without conditions attached.
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Acronyms
AAU Assigned Amount Unit
BECCS Bioenergy combined with Carbon Capture and Storage
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CO2e Carbon dioxide equivalent
For the purpose of this report, greenhouse gas emissions (unless 
otherwise specified) are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases 
listed in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as carbon dioxide 
equivalent. The carbon dioxide equivalent of the various gases is 
computed by using the global warming potentials published in the 
Second IPCC Assessment Report. 
COP Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change
GDP Gross Domestic Product
Gt Gigatonne (1 billion metric tonnes)
IAM Integrated assessment model
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LULUCF Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
Mt Megatonne (1 million metric tonnes)
RCPs Representative Concentration Pathways. RCPs form an important 
element of the new scenarios used for assessment of climate change. 
UNFCCC UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
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Technical Summary
The Emissions Gap Report 
Are the Copenhagen Accord Pledges Sufficient to Limit 
Global Warming to 2° C or 1.5°C? 
A Preliminary Assessment 
The Copenhagen Accord declared that deep cuts in global emissions are 
required “so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius”. 
The Accord called for an assessment that would consider strengthening the 
long-term goal including “temperature rises of 1.5 degrees”. Since December 
2009, 140 countries1 have associated themselves with the Copenhagen Accord. 
Of these, 85 countries have pledged to reduce their emissions or constrain their 
growth up to 2020.
The question remains, however, whether these pledges are sufficient to achieve 
the Accord’s temperature limits, or if there will be a gap between what is needed 
and what is expected as a result of the pledges.
Many scientific groups have identified global emission pathways2, or emissions 
trajectories, that are consistent with various temperature limits, while others 
have estimated global emissions in 2020 based on the Copenhagen Accord 
pledges. Some groups have calculated both. Not surprisingly, different groups 
have come up with different estimates. The range of estimates is caused, for 
example, by the fact that some of the pledges have conditions attached, such 
as the provision of finance and technology or ambitious action from other 
countries. This leads to a range of potential outcomes rather than a single 
estimate. 
To understand and interpret the range of results coming from different studies, 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), in conjunction with the 
European Climate Foundation and the National Institute of Ecology, Mexico, 
convened a six-month preliminary assessment of these studies. This assessment 
aims to provide policy-makers with an overview of results from various studies, 
as well as their areas of agreement and disagreement. Individuals from 
twenty-five groups have contributed to the assessment and co-authored this 
publication. This report is a summary of that work.
Notably, the 2020 emissions reduction pledges analysed in this report were not 
decided under a quantitative top-down approach to emissions management 
— one that starts with temperature limits for which the mitigation effort is 
distributed among countries by negotiation. Therefore, at this time we are only 
analysing the effect of the offers brought forward by countries in the form of 
pledges under the Copenhagen Accord.3
1 As of 12 November 2010.
2 An ”emission pathway” shows how emissions change into the future
3 We note that this is a technical report that explores possible outcomes associated with the 
implementation of the Copenhagen Accord. It is not intended to legitimize the Accord, nor does it 
constitute an endorsement of a pledge-and-review architecture vis-à-vis a target-based approach 
for emission reductions. In addition this report is not intended to advocate any particular policy or 
emissions pathway. 
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The final plenary meeting at COP 15, 
Copenhagen, Denmark  
19 December, 2009
This assessment addresses four main questions:
	What 2020 emission levels are consistent with the2° C and 1.5°C limits4?
	What are the expected global emissions in 2020?
	How big is the “emissions gap”?
	How can the gap be reduced? 
4  Although the Copenhagen Accord is not explicit about the baseline against which temperature increase should be measured, we have assumed 
that it is pre-industrial levels.
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Key findings 
– Studies show that emission levels of approximately 44 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) 
(range: 39-44 GtCO2e*) in 2020 would be consistent with a “likely” chance of limiting global warming to2° 
C.
– Under business-as-usual projections, global emissions could reach 56 GtCO2e (range: 54-60 GtCO2e) in 
2020, leaving a gap of 12 GtCO2e.
– If the lowest-ambition pledges were implemented in a “lenient” fashion**, emissions could be lowered 
slightly to 53 GtCO2e (range: 52-57 GtCO2e), leaving a significant gap of 9 GtCO2e.
– The gap could be reduced substantially by policy options being discussed in the negotiations:
	By countries moving to higher ambition, conditional pledges
	By the negotiations adopting rules that avoid a net increase in emissions from (a) “lenient” 
accounting of land use, land-use change and forestry activities and (b) the use of surplus 
emission units 
– If the above policy options were to be implemented, emissions in 2020 could be lowered to 49 GtCO2e 
(range: 47-51 GtCO2e), reducing the size of the gap to 5 GtCO2e.  This is approximately equal to the 
annual global emissions from all the world’s cars, buses and transport in 2005 – But this is also almost 60 
per cent of the way towards reaching the2° C target. 
– It will also be important to avoid increasing the gap by “double counting” of offsets.
– Studies show that it is feasible to bridge the remaining gap through more ambitious domestic actions, 
some of which could be supported by international climate finance.
– With or without a gap, current studies indicate that steep emission reductions are needed post 2020 in 
order to keep our chances of limiting warming to2° C or 1.5°C.
*  Range here refers to the “majority of results”, i.e. their 20th and 80th percentile. 
** “Lenient” in this report is used to refer to the situation in which LULUCF accounting rules and the use of surplus 
emission units result in a net increase in emissions
Box 1: Method for assessing emission levels consistent with temperature limits
In this assessment we examine two groups of pathways: (1) pathways produced by integrated assessment models 
(IAM), which simulate the energy-economic system including the turnover of energy infrastructure; and (2) 
“stylized” pathways, produced by other models that do not explicitly model the change in the energy system or 
feasibility of emission reduction rates. We focus on results from IAMs because they are able to actually describe 
the system’s response to different policies and measures and emission-related targets (see Box 2). However, we 
also draw on “stylized” scenarios in order to better understand the theoretical rates of emission reduction and 
magnitude of negative emissions needed to be consistent with particular temperature limits.
A total of 223 emission pathways produced by 15 modelling groups have been analysed5. We account for many, 
but not all, sources of the uncertainty of models and data by compiling results from a number of studies and 
identifying conclusions that appear robust. 
 
5 Detail on the studies reviewed can be found in Chapters 2 and 3 of the full report. 
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What 2020 emission levels are consistent 
with the2° C and 1.5°C limits? 
1. The level of human-induced global warming is 
primarily determined by the cumulative emissions 
over time, i.e. when emissions peak, at what level, 
and how fast they decline thereafter.
The total stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
has a strong effect on climate forcing related to climate 
change. This stock is determined by the accumulated 
emissions of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. It 
follows that cumulative emissions have a profound 
influence on the long-term increase of global 
temperature6. 
An important point is that several different emission 
pathways can result in the same cumulative emissions 
over a period of time. But not all pathways are considered 
equally feasible; some are thought to be constrained 
by an upper ceiling on the rate of emission reductions 
due to technological, economic, social and political 
factors. Hence, the feasibility of reduction rates plays a 
central role in determining which 2020 emission levels 
are consistent with temperature limits. Also important 
are assumptions about the feasibility of “negative 
emissions”, i.e. the net removal of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
from the atmosphere through, for example, planting 
forests or capturing CO2 from biomass (see Box 3).
Studies show that there is a trade-off between the 
timing of the peak and the rate of decrease in emissions 
afterwards – the sooner and lower the peak, the slower 
the rate of decrease can be afterwards. Conversely, the 
longer the peak is delayed and the higher it is, the faster 
emissions must decline afterwards, and/or the stronger 
the negative emissions over the long term, in order to 
stay within the temperature limit (see Figure A). 
Many recent modelling studies have assumed that it 
would be unrealistic for global emissions to immediately 
start decreasing (because of political and economic 
factors) and therefore have focused on scenarios in 
which global emissions continue to increase for a few 
years and then decrease sharply afterwards.
6 It is important to note that a number of other factors, such as the 
level of sulphate aerosols and the shape of the pathway, also have a 
significant influence on the maximum temperature increase. 
Figure A: Illustration of different pathway 
types for the same temperature increase. See 
Point 1 for explanation. 
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Box 2: Understanding temperature limits 
A temperature increase of 2° C or 1.5° C represents an increase in global average near surface temperature 
compared with pre-industrial times. This is meant to be an indicator of local climate changes. Importantly, a 
2° C or 1.5° C global average increase can translate into much higher temperature changes locally. 
There are significant uncertainties in the relationship between temperature, emission pathways, cumulative 
emissions, and atmospheric concentrations. Therefore, in this assessment, each emission pathway is associated 
with a range of probabilities for temperature, reflecting uncertainties in the carbon cycle and many other 
aspects of the climate system. Hence, an emission pathway is associated with probabilities of staying within 
a range of different temperature changes. 
To illustrate, an emission pathway that has a 50 per cent chance of limiting warming to under 2° C, may also 
have a 5 per cent probability that warming will exceed 3° C and, say, a 10 per cent probability of staying below 
1.5° C. Similarly, an emission pathway that has a 66 per cent chance of staying under 2° C, may also have a 
probability of less than 3 per cent that warming will exceed 3° C and, say, a 20 per cent probability of staying 
below 1.5° C. 
In this assessment we focus on emission pathways that lead to a global average temperature increase of less 
than 2° C over this century with a “likely” chance (greater than 66 per cent probability) and then explain how 
they would be different for a “medium” chance (50-66 per cent probability). In addition we examine pathways 
in which the temperature changes are below 1.5° C by the end of the century, but “overshoots” this value for 
part of the century. 
2. Emission pathways consistent with a “likely” 
chance of meeting the 2° C limit generally peak 
before 2020, have emission levels in 2020 around 44 
GtCO2e (range: 39-44 GtCO2e
7), have steep emission 
reductions afterwards and/or reach negative 
emissions in the longer term.
Emission pathways assessed in this report that provide 
a “likely” (greater than 66 per cent) chance of staying 
within the 2° C limit, have the following characteristics: 
	 A peak in global annual emissions8 before 2020.
	 2020 global emission levels of around 44 GtCO2e 
(range: 39-44 GtCO2e).
9  
7 All ranges given in this report represent the 20th and 80th 
percentiles of results, unless otherwise stated. This range has been 
chosen to reflect the majority of results of the analysis.
8 Global annual emissions consist of emissions of the “Kyoto basket of 
gases” coming from energy, industry and land use. 
9  These are rounded numbers. If numbers with one decimal place 
were shown it would be clear that the upper end of the range is 
slightly greater than 44 GtCO2e and the median slightly smaller than 
44.  The fact that both the median and upper end of the range are 44 
indicates that many of the estimates were close to 44. 
	 Average annual reduction rates of CO2 from energy 
and industry between 2020 and 2050 of around 3 
per cent (range: 2.2 to 3.1 per cent)10. 
	 2050 global emissions that are 50-60 per cent below 
their 1990 levels. 
	 In most cases, negative CO2 emissions from energy 
and industry starting at some point in the second 
half of the century.
Accepting a “medium” (50-66 per cent) rather than 
“likely” chance of staying below the 2° C limit relaxes the 
constraints only slightly: emissions in 2020 could be 1 
GtCO2e higher, and average rates of reduction after 2020 
could be 2.5 per cent per year (range 2.2-3.0 per cent). 
Nevertheless, global emissions still need to peak before 
2020 in the majority of cases.
10 Throughout this report emission reduction rates are given for 
carbon dioxide emissions from energy and industry and expressed 
relative to 2000 emission levels except when explicitly stated 
otherwise 
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3. It turns out that the 2020 emission levels with a 
“likely” chance of staying within the 2° C limit can be 
about the same as those with a “medium” or lower 
chance of meeting the 1.5° C target. However, to have 
a higher chance of meeting the 1.5° C target the 
emission reduction rates after 2020 would have to 
be much faster. 
In this assessment we have identified some emission 
pathways that keep the increase in temperature below 
1.5° C by 2100, but “overshoot” this limit by a small amount 
for a few decades prior to 2100. However, the chance of 
doing so is low (range: 27-35 per cent probability). The 
emission levels in 2020 of these pathways are about the 
same as those in Point 2 above, i.e. they are consistent 
with a likely chance of staying below the 2° C limit 
throughout the twenty-first century.11
11 One IAM pathway has been identified that has a “medium” chance 
of complying with the 1.5°C limit by 2100 (with some overshoot for a 
few decades) and shows emission reduction rates considered feasible 
in the IAM literature. See Chapter 2, full report.
In addition, the most ambitious “stylized” pathways 
show that staying within the 1.5° C limit with overshoot 
(and with a “medium” or “likely” chance) have emission 
reduction rates after 2020 that are at the high end or 
faster than presently found in the IAM literature. Lower 
emission levels in 2020 would allow slower emission 
reduction rates after 2020.
These findings should be considered preliminary, 
however, as few studies have explicitly looked at the 
question of achieving the 1.5° C target.
4. The range in results stems from uncertainties of 
assumptions and models used for calculations. 
The range in estimates of emission levels comes from 
model uncertainties including the omission of feedback 
phenomena in the climate system and (in some models) 
the impact of aerosols on climate forcing. The uncertainty 
of key assumptions, such as baseline emissions, also has 
an influence on calculations. 
Box 3. What are feasible emission reduction rates? What are negative emissions?
The behaviour of the climate system dictates that future temperatures will be strongly influenced by emissions throughout 
the coming decades. Hence, the consistency of 2020 emissions with a given temperature limit can only be judged if emissions 
after 2020 are taken into account. For that reason it is important to know the feasible rates of emission reductions after 2020. 
Feasibility refers to whether a particular emission pathway is considered achievable. It depends upon technical, economic, 
political and social constraints and the extent of mitigation policy. Some of these factors, in particular technological and 
economic feasibility, can be represented in models such as integrated assessment models (IAM). These include assumptions 
about the maximum feasible rate of introducing technology, maximum costs of technologies, feasibility of specific system 
configurations, and limits regarding behavioural changes. Another important factor determining the maximum emissions 
reduction rate is the typical lifetime of machinery and infrastructure. These lifetimes are important if mitigation strategies 
aim to avoid premature replacement of capital, which is often considered to be very expensive.  Other factors, such as 
political or social attitudes, might also influence the rate of emission reductions, but they are usually not taken into account 
by IAMs. 
There are different views about feasible emission reduction rates. The highest average rate of emission reductions over the 
next four to five decades found in the IAM literature is around 3.5 per cent per year. This would imply a decarbonisation rate 
(the rate of decrease in emissions per unit of GDP) of more than 6 per cent per year. Historically (1969-2009), a decarbonisation 
rate of about 1% has been seen globally.  However, it is important to note that expectations about feasibility can change 
with future developments in technology, attitudes, and economics. 
One of many important elements related to the feasibility of emission pathways is negative emissions. Many of the scenarios 
compiled in this assessment show global negative carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (from energy and industry) from mid-
century onwards in order to achieve the temperature limits examined here12. 
Global negative CO2 emissions would occur if the removal of CO2 from the atmosphere is greater than the emissions into it. 
This might be achievable through large-scale afforestation efforts, for example. Many models assume a large deployment 
of bioenergy combined with carbon-capture-and-storage (BECCS) technology in order to achieve negative emissions. The 
feasibility of large scale bioenergy systems is related to its sustainability, including the availability of sufficient land and 
water, its impact on biodiversity, and the productivity of biomass. 
If negative CO2 emissions at a significant scale are not possible, then the options for meeting the limits are substantially 
constrained.
12 In this assessment, seventy-five per cent of scenarios with a “likely” chance of staying below 2°C and fifty per cent of the scenarios that have a “medium” 
chance of staying below 2°C.
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What are the expected global emissions 
in 2020? 
5. Global emissions in 2020 will depend on the 
pledges implemented and the rules surrounding 
them. On one hand, emissions in 2020 could be 
as low as 49 GtCO2e (range: 47-51 GtCO2e) when 
countries implement their conditional pledges with 
“strict” accounting rules. On the other hand, they 
could be as high as 53 GtCO2e (range: 52-57 GtCO2e) 
when countries implement unconditional pledges 
with “lenient” accounting rules. 
As a reference point, without pledges global greenhouse 
gas emissions may increase from 45 GtCO2e in 2005 
to around 56 GtCO2e in 2020 (range: 54-60 GtCO2e) 
according to business-as-usual projections. These results 
come from thirteen studies that have been reviewed in 
this assessment. 
Results show that the pledges, if implemented, are 
expected to reduce global emissions in 2020 compared 
to business-as-usual projections. How much lower will 
depend on: 
i. Whether countries implement their unconditional 
(lower ambition) or conditional (higher ambition) 
pledges. Conditions attached to the pledges 
include, for example, the provision of adequate 
climate finance and ambitious action from other 
countries.
ii. The extent to which accounting rules for land 
use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) can 
be used to weaken the mitigation targets of 
industrialized countries. This could occur if credit 
is given for LULUCF activities that would have 
happened in any case without further policy 
intervention. 
iii. The extent to which surplus emissions units, 
particularly those that could be carried over from 
the current commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol, are used to meet industrialized country 
targets.
For the purposes of this report, we have developed 
four cases that provide a range of plausible outcomes 
from the UNFCCC negotiations, each with different 
combinations of the factors mentioned above. We use 
the term “lenient rules” to refer to cases in which countries 
maximise the use of surplus emission units and “lenient 
LULUCF credits”, and thereby weaken mitigation targets.13 
13 Credits given for carbon removals from existing forests or other 
sinks that would have occurred without policy intervention. See 
Chapter 3, full report for more detail on the “lenient” and “strict” 
definitions.
We use “strict rules” for the cases in which they do not14. 
Case 1 – “Unconditional pledge, lenient rules”: If countries 
implement their unconditional pledges and are subject 
to “lenient” accounting rules (as explained in the 
paragraph above), global emissions are expected to be 
about 53 GtCO2e in 2020 (range: 52-57 GtCO2e), or about 
3 GtCO2e lower than business-as-usual projections. 
Case 2 – “Unconditional pledge, strict rules”: If countries 
implement their unconditional pledges and are subject 
to “strict” accounting rules (as explained in the paragraph 
above), global emissions are expected to drop to 52 
GtCO2e (range: 50-55 GtCO2e). 
Case 3 – “Conditional pledge, lenient rules”: If countries 
implement their higher ambition, conditional pledges 
and are subject to “lenient” accounting rules, global 
emissions are expected to drop to 51 GtCO2e (range: 49-
53 GtCO2e)
Case 4 – “Conditional pledge, strict rules”: If countries 
implement their higher ambition, conditional pledges, 
and are subject to “strict” accounting rules, global 
emissions are expected to drop to 49 GtCO2e in 2020. 
(range: 47-51 GtCO2e). 
Thus, under the most ambitious outcome, the pledges 
could result in 2020 emissions that are 7 GtCO2e lower 
than business-as-usual.
6. Emissions could be lower or higher than these 
estimates, as a result of other factors.  Emissions 
could be higher if offsets were to be “double-
counted” towards both industrialized and 
developing country pledges or if pledges were to be 
ineffectively implemented. Emissions could be lower 
as a result of international climate finance for further 
mitigation efforts, or if countries were to strengthen 
their pledges, or if domestic activities went beyond 
their pledges. 
The estimates reflected in the four cases do not take into 
account all factors that could affect emissions in 2020. 
Two factors could increase emissions and lessen the 
impact of the pledges. If industrialized countries were 
to use offsets to meet their targets, and the developing 
countries that supplied the offsets also counted them 
towards their pledges, then emissions would be higher 
than estimated in Point 5. This “double counting” of 
offsets could increase emissions in 2020 by up to 1.3 
14 Note that surplus emission units and credits given for LULUCF 
activities do not necessarily weaken mitigation targets. 
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Box 4. What are the temperature implications of present pledges?
It is not possible to precisely answer the above question because the trend in temperature will strongly depend 
on the pathway of emissions after 2020. But results from integrated assessment models give us a hint at the range 
of pathways that could occur between 2020 and 2100. If we start at the level of emissions expected from the 
Copenhagen Accord pledges in 2020 and then follow the range of these pathways through to 2100, we find that 
they imply a temperature increase of between 2.5 to 5o C before the end of the century (see Figure 2). The lower 
bound is the case in which emissions are fairly stringently controlled after 2020, and the upper in which they 
are more weakly controlled. In other words, emission levels in 2020 implied by current pledges do not seem to 
be consistent with 2° C or 1.5° C temperature limits. To stay within these limits, emission levels would have to be 
lower in 2020 and then be followed by considerable reductions. 
Figure B – Temperature increases associated with emission pathways and compared to the expected 
emissions from the pledges: Coloured bands show groups of IAM emission pathways that have approximately 
the same “likely” avoided temperature increase in the twenty-first century. Specifically the coloured bands 
show the 20th to 80th percentile range of the IAM pathways associated with those temperature increases.15 
Superimposed on top of the pathways is the range of estimated emissions resulting from the Copenhagen Accord 
pledges. The small black bar shows the range of median estimates from the four pledge cases. The thin blue bar 
represents the wider range of estimates associated with those four cases (the 20th to 80th percentile range).
15 The gaps between the coloured bands come about because this report mainly compiled pathways from low greenhouse gas stabilisation 
scenario.
GtCO2e in 2020. Similarly, if domestic policies were to be 
ineffective in meeting the pledges, emissions could be 
higher in 2020. 
There are also factors that could further decrease 
emissions in 2020. If substantial international funds were 
to become available as agreed to in the Copenhagen 
Accord, emissions could be as much as 2.5 GtCO2e 
lower in 2020 than in the four cases above. Similarly, if 
domestic policies went beyond international pledges 
or if pledges were strengthened, emissions could be 
substantially lower. 
7. A number of uncertainties lead to a significant 
range in estimates of expected 2020 emissions. 
There is a large range between different groups’ 
estimates for 2020 emission levels, even under the same 
assumptions regarding conditionality of pledges and 
accounting rules (range: -4 to +8 GtCO2e around the 
median estimate, depending on the case). The range of 
estimates is caused, for example, by differences in the 
underlying data sets, the treatment of emissions from 
LULUCF, the estimates of emissions from international 
transport, and the assumptions made about business-
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How big is the “emissions gap”? 
8. A “gap” is expected in 2020 between emission levels 
consistent with a 2° C limit and those resulting from 
the Copenhagen Accord pledges. The size of the gap 
depends on the likelihood of a particular temperature 
limit, and how the pledges are implemented. If the 
aim is to have a “likely” chance (greater than 66 per 
cent) of staying below the 2° C temperature limit, 
the gap would range from 5-9 GtCO2e, depending on 
how the pledges are implemented. 
As a reference point, we saw in Point 2 that to have a 
“likely” chance of staying below the 2° C temperature 
limit, global emissions should be around 44 GtCO2e 
(range: 39-44 GtCO2e). But according to business-as-
usual projections global emissions in 2020 may be 
around 56 GtCO2e (range: 54-60 GtCO2e). This leaves a 
gap of about 12 GtCO2e (range: 10-21 GtCO2e). 
The four pledge cases, each with different assumptions 
about the future outcome of the UNFCCC negotiations, 
result in different gaps as follows16: 
Case 1 – “Unconditional pledges, lenient rules”. The gap 
would be reduced down to 9 GtCO2e (range: 8-18 
GtCO2e) or about 3 GtCO2e below business-as-usual. 
Case 2 – “Unconditional pledges, strict rules”. The gap 
would be about 8 GtCO2e (range: 6-16 GtCO2e), or about 
4 GtCO2e below business-as-usual. 
Case 3 – “Conditional pledges, lenient rules”. The gap 
would be about 7 GtCO2e (range: 5-14 GtCO2e) or about 
5 GtCO2e below business-as-usual. 
Case 4 – “Conditional pledges, strict rules”. The gap would 
be about 5 GtCO2e (range: 3-12 GtCO2e). This is about 7 
GtCO2e lower than business-as-usual, and almost 60 per 
cent of the way to the 2°C levels. Although the gap would 
16 All cases refer to emission levels consistent with a “likely” chance of 
staying below 2o C. 
be considerably narrower than the business-as-usual 
case, it would still be as large as the total greenhouse 
gas emissions from the European Union in 2005 or from 
global road transport emissions in that year. 
These results can be seen in Figure C.
Double-counting of international emission offsets could 
also increase the gap up to 1.3 GtCO2e. This is a real risk 
since the Copenhagen Accord does not include rules 
regarding the use of international offsets. 
As a final point here, to have a “medium” rather than a 
“likely” chance of staying within the 2° C limit, global 
emissions in 2020 can be about 1 GtCO2e higher and the 
gap also narrows by about 1 GtCO2e. 
9. There are considerable uncertainties around the 
estimates of the gap.
Since the emissions gap is the difference between 
emission levels for different temperature targets and 
expected emissions in 2020, the gap also inherits the 
uncertainties of these two components. The reader will 
note that the range around median estimates (Figure C) 
is not symmetric; the lower bound extends about 1-2 
GtCO2e below the median, whereas the upper bound 
rises 7-9 GtCO2e above it (for a “likely” chance of staying 
below 2o C). One way to interpret this skewed range is 
that the gap may turn out to be higher rather than lower 
than the median.
This assessment focuses on the majority (20th – 80th 
percentile) of emission pathways. But there are obviously 
also results outside of this range. In the extreme case, 
if we combine the highest 2o C emission levels with 
the lowest estimate of expected emissions, the gap 
disappears. At the opposite extreme, if we combine the 
lowest 2o C emission levels with the highest estimate of 
expected emissions, the gap would be greater than 20 
GtCO2e. 
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Figure C: Comparison of expected emissions in 2020 with the emission levels consistent with a “likely” 
chance of meeting the 2° C limit. The figure compares the expected emissions in 2020 resulting from the four 
pledge cases with the emission levels consistent with a “likely” chance of meeting the 2° C limit. The median 
estimates and range of estimates (20th to 80th percentile) are shown. The gap between expected emissions and the 
2° C levels is given below in each case.  
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How can the gap be reduced? 
10. Various international policy actions are available 
to close the gap.
a) Reducing the gap through higher ambition 
pledges. 
The gap can be reduced by around 2-3 GtCO2e (with 
a range of estimates from 2 to 5 GtCO2e) by moving 
from the unconditional (lower ambition) pledges to the 
conditional (higher ambition) pledges. 
– Industrialized countries: The majority of this 
reduction would come from industrialized 
countries, whose pledges are sometimes 
conditional on the ambitious action of other 
countries or on domestic legislation. 
– Developing countries: A smaller, but still 
important, part of the reduction would come 
from developing countries, whose pledges 
are sometimes conditional on the adequate 
provision of international climate finance or 
technology transfer. 
b) Reducing the gap by tightening the rules.
The gap can be reduced by around 1-2 GtCO2e by 
ensuring that “strict” rules apply to the use of LULUCF 
credits and surplus emission units. 
– LULUCF accounting:  If industrialized 
countries apply “strict” accounting rules to 
minimise the use of what we refer to as ‘lenient 
LULUCF credits’17 , they would strengthen the 
effect of their pledges and thus reduce the 
emissions gap by up to 0.8 GtCO2e.
– Surplus emission units: Likewise, if the rules 
governing the use of surplus emission units 
under the Kyoto Protocol were designed in 
a way that would avoid the weakening of 
mitigation targets, the gap could be reduced 
by up to 2.3 GtCO2e. These include units carried 
over from the current commitment period and 
any potential new surpluses created in the 
next.  
We note that policy options (a) and (b) are 
interdependent and so their benefits cannot necessarily 
be added together. But we estimate that the two options 
combined could reduce emissions by around 4 GtCO2e in 
2020 (with a range of estimates of 4-6 GtCO2e) compared 
with the least ambitious case (case 1).
17 Credits given for carbon removals from existing forests or other 
sinks that would have occurred without policy intervention 
In addition, the risk of the gap increasing in size can 
be avoided if the negotiations set rules regarding 
international offsets to prevent them from being 
counted towards both industrialized and developing 
country pledges. “Double-counting” would increase the 
gap by up to 1.3 GtCO2e.
11. It is feasible to close the remaining gap through 
further mitigation actions by countries, some of 
which could be supported by international climate 
finance.
If the above measures were to be taken, there might 
still be a gap of 5 GtCO2e compared with a 2° C limit. 
This gap could be closed if countries were to adopt 
more ambitious actions or pledges. The results from 
integrated assessment models (IAM) suggest that it is 
possible to reach emission levels where there is no gap, 
using mitigation measures that are economically and 
technologically feasible. . 
Analysis also shows that international climate finance 
in line with the Copenhagen Accord could help achieve 
some of these reductions in developing countries. 
12. Studies show that laying the groundwork for 
steep rates of emissions reduction from 2020 
onwards would be necessary for staying within a 
limit of 2° C and even more so for 1.5° C, whatever 
the outcome of the pledges.
The results of the IAM pathways that have a “likely” 
(greater than 66 per cent) or even “medium” (50-66 per 
cent) chance of limiting temperature increase to 2° C 
show average annual emission reduction rates of greater 
than 2 per cent per year after 2020. Achieving this over 
the long-term would be unprecedented because, on the 
contrary, global emissions have almost continuously 
grown since the industrial revolution. 
The higher the emissions in 2020, the faster the rate of 
decline required thereafter to meet temperature targets. 
Therefore, if targets are to be met, it will be essential to lay 
the groundwork now for such rates of reduction. This can 
be done, for example, by avoiding lock-in of high carbon 
infrastructure with long life-spans and developing and 
introducing advanced clean technologies. 
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1.1. COPEnHAGEn, TEMPERATURE LIMITS 
AnD PLEDGES
Following the 15th session of the Conference of the 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, forty-two18 industrialized countries 
submitted quantified economy-wide emission targets 
for 2020. In addition, forty-three19 developing countries 
submitted nationally appropriate mitigation actions for 
inclusion in the Appendices to the 2009 Copenhagen 
Accord.20 These pledges21 have since become the basis 
for analysing the extent to which the global community 
is on track to meet long-term temperature goals as 
outlined in the Copenhagen Accord: 
(Para 1)…To achieve the ultimate objective of the 
Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system, we shall, recognizing the scientific view that 
the increase in global temperature should be below 2 
18 http://unfccc.int/home/items/5264.php
19 http://unfccc.int/home/items/5265.php
20 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.  
pdf#page=4
21 For the purposes of this report, pledges include Annex I targets and 
non-Annex I actions.
Box 1a: Understanding temperature limits
A warming limit of 2° C or 1.5° C refers to the increase in global annual average near surface temperature compared with 
pre-industrial times. This temperature is intended to be an indicator for local changes in a wide range of observable 
quantities, such as precipitation. It is important to note that a 2° C global average rise can translate into much larger (or 
smaller) temperature changes in different latitudes and elevations. Moreover, undesirable impacts will generally be driven 
by local climate changes (e.g. changes in rainfall patterns) and often by changes in extremes in different seasons rather 
than by annual average temperature values.
There are significant uncertainties in the relationship between temperature, emission pathways, cumulative emissions, 
and atmospheric concentrations. Therefore, in this assessment, each emission pathway is associated with probabilities 
of staying within a range of temperature limits. These probabilities reflect the uncertainties in the carbon cycle as well 
as many other aspects of the climate system. To illustrate, an emission pathway that has a 50 per cent chance of limiting 
warming to under 2° C may also have a 5 per cent probability that warming will exceed 3° C and, say, a 10 per cent 
probability of staying below 1.5° C. If we then consider an emission pathway that has a 66 per cent chance of being under 
2° C, it may also have a probability of less than 3 per cent that warming will exceed 3° C, and, say, a 20 per cent probability 
of staying below 1.5° C.
Therefore, it is not possible to guarantee that a particular emission pathway will achieve a temperature limit of 2° C or 1.5° 
C, and probabilities of achievement are used instead. In this assessment we focus on two temperature limits, 2° C and 1.5° 
C; and two probabilities of meeting them – a “likely” chance (probability greater than 66 per cent) and a “medium” chance 
(probability between 50-66 per cent).
degrees Celsius, on the basis of equity and in the context 
of sustainable development, enhance our long-term 
cooperative action to combat climate change.
(Para 2)…We agree that deep cuts in global emissions 
are required according to science, and as documented 
by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report with a view to 
reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in 
global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take 
action to meet this objective consistent with science 
and on the basis of equity.
(Para 12)…We call for an assessment of the 
implementation of this Accord to be completed 
by 2015, including in the light of the Convention’s 
ultimate objective. This would include consideration of 
strengthening the long-term goal referencing various 
matters presented by the science, including in relation 
to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius.
This publication aims to assess the following questions: 
are countries’ pledges of action collectively consistent 
with and, if implemented, likely to achieve the 2° C 
and 1.5° C temperature goals? If not, how big is the 
gap between emission levels consistent with these 
temperature goals and the emissions expected as a 
result of the pledges?
Notably, the 2020 emission reduction pledges were not 
decided through a quantitative top-down approach to 
emissions management, i.e. one that would begin with 
agreed-upon temperature limits and then be followed 
by negotiation to distribute the burden of emission 
reductions necessary to meet these limits. Therefore, 
at this time we can only analyse the emerging “global 
deal” on climate change by summing pledges from the 
bottom up—in other words, based on offers already 
brought forward voluntarily by countries.
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1.2. SCOPE OF THE REPORT
This report addresses many of the key issues raised by 
the Copenhagen Accord. For example, the emission 
pathways consistent with temperature limits and the 
expected emissions in 2020 based on current pledges. 
Furthermore, it examines whether there is a gap between 
emission levels consistent with temperature limits and 
expected emissions, and furthermore, the increases in 
temperature consistent with such a gap in emissions. 
Outside the scope of the report are issues related to the 
comparability and equity of pledges.
1.3. A MULTI-DIMEnSIOnAL CHALLEnGE
In assessing these issues we are confronted with a 
series of highly complex issues, which result from both 
scientific and political factors. 
In Chapter 2, we focus on the likelihood of various 
emission pathways staying within temperature limits. 
For these pathways we identify the period in which 
emissions peak, the level of emissions in 2020, and the 
corresponding emission reduction rates after 2020. 
Results include emission pathways from integrated 
assessment models (IAM) and carbon cycle and climate 
models. Also discussed are current views about the 
feasibility of emission reductions and negative emissions, 
as well as factors determining long-term temperature, 
including cumulative emissions.
Chapter 3 reviews estimates of global emission levels 
in 2020 based on country emission pledges. Among 
the factors influencing these estimates are whether 
pledges are independent of, or conditional on, other 
countries’ actions, financing or technological support. 
For industrialized countries, key factors include: the 
accounting procedures for emissions or uptake of 
carbon from land use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF); the potential for international climate 
finance, as agreed in the Copenhagen Accord to enable 
further emission reductions; the carry-over of emission 
reduction units from the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012); and the potential double 
counting of offsets with emission reductions from non-
Annex I countries’ actions. Emission estimates are also 
influenced by the uncertainty of base year emissions 
and by assumptions needed for filling in sectoral or 
other gaps in the emission estimates of various groups.
The pledges of industrialized countries are fairly easy 
to convert into emission estimates because they are 
usually related to historic emissions. However, more 
assumptions are needed to make this conversion for 
developing countries because their pledges have 
usually been pegged to economic, demographic or 
other projections.
Chapter 4 builds upon the previous two chapters by 
examining a possible “emissions gap” in 2020 between 
emission levels consistent with temperature limits and 
expected emissions resulting from the pledges. It then 
goes on to explore policy options for narrowing the size 
of the gap.
Chapter 5 goes a step further by reporting on possible 
long-term temperature changes following from current 
pledges.
The online version of the report22 contains three 
appendices with additional information about emission 
pledge calculations in this report. Appendix 1 provides 
detail on the differences between the four pledge cases 
described in Chapter 3 and the uncertainties around 
them. Appendix 2 provides a country-by-country 
analysis of the pledges of the largest emitting countries. 
Appendix 3 compares the findings of modelling groups 
that have assessed country pledges.
22 www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport
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2.1 InTRODUCTIOn 
This chapter identifies future emission pathways that are 
consistent with a 2° C or 1.5° C temperature limit. Many 
scenarios and pathways for annual global emissions of 
greenhouse gases have been published in the scientific 
literature to explore possible long-term trends in climate 
change. This literature has been used in this report to 
understand the kind of pathways consistent with the 
goal of limiting global temperature increase to less than 
2° C or 1.5° C above pre-industrial levels. 
Among the different studies of future emission 
pathways, two main types can be identified. The first 
type is produced by integrated assessment models 
(IAM), which simulate both future climate and future 
socio-economic systems, including the emissions of 
greenhouse gases from industry and power generation, 
agriculture, forestry and other land use activities (see for 
example Clarke et al. 2009, Edenhofer et al. 2010, van 
Vuuren et al. 2007). IAMs take into account assumptions 
about technological and economic constraints and so, 
to some extent, provide a view on what are “feasible” 
emission reductions. The second type of pathway, 
described here as “stylized”, explores more directly the 
relationship between emissions and temperature, for 
example by making assumptions about the timing and 
magnitude of peak emissions and rates of reduction23 
23 Throughout this report emission reduction rates are given for 
carbon dioxide emissions from energy and industry and expressed 
relative to 2000 emission levels except when explicitly stated 
otherwise.
following the peak. These are pathways produced by 
models that do not explicitly simulate change in the 
energy system or feasibility of emission reduction rates. 
“Stylized” pathways are designed to better understand 
the temperature outcomes resulting from emission 
pathways computed by carbon cycle and climate 
models, without making assumptions about how those 
emissions are produced (see for example Lowe et al. 
2009, Meinshausen et al. 2009). 
Although both approaches provide important insights 
and findings, only results from IAMs are used here for 
quantitative analysis, unless otherwise stated.
Scenarios published by IAMs in the literature mostly look 
into optimal pathways to achieve a certain long-term 
target and not into the question of what emission range in 
2020 would achieve a temperature limit. For this reason, 
we have assembled a large set of scenarios computed 
with various objectives in mind, and have tested them 
to see if they are consistent with temperature limits. The 
combination of these scenarios provides insight into 
the full range of 2020 emissions consistent with long-
term temperature limits. It is possible that other feasible 
pathways will be identified by modelling groups, once 
they begin to run their models to explore the full 2020 
emissions range.
Although IAM studies have paid little explicit attention 
to the question of the range of 2020 emissions consistent 
with temperature limits, there are some studies of 
stylized pathways that have done this (Bowen and 
Ranger 2009, Meinshausen et al. 2009). 
In our quantitative assessment of IAM results we have 
attempted to take the differences between studies (in 
terms of uncertainties of various input assumptions 
and different approaches) into account by re-analysing 
the results of these studies using a common set of 
assumptions about base year emissions, coverage 
of non-CO2 gases, carbon cycle assumptions and 
interpretation of climate goals (as explained in Box 2a). 
These re-analysed pathways have been evaluated in 
terms of their consistency with a 2° C and 1.5° C limit. 
An important factor here is that projections of the future 
climate all contain uncertainty (Meehl et al. 2007). This 
means that when discussing the possibility of satisfying 
a particular temperature limit, it is necessary to express 
the result in terms of a probability. As explained in Box 2a, 
the MAGICC model (Meinshausen et al. 2008) has been 
used here to take into account some of this uncertainty.
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2.2 WHAT DETERMInES LOnG-TERM 
TEMPERATURE?
Many greenhouse gases emitted by human activities 
have long atmospheric residence times and alter 
the Earth’s energy balance. In addition, the average 
temperature of the Earth typically adjusts only slowly to 
changes in the energy balance (Lowe et al. 2009, Solomon 
et al. 2009). These slow-change processes imply that 
decision makers need to take into account long-term 
effects of current and near term emissions (National 
Research Council 2009). This is even more important as 
many impacts of climate change are potentially adverse 
and/or irreversible (at least on time scales of relevance 
to society). 
A number of recent studies have shown that one of the 
strongest predictors of temperature increase within 
the twenty-first century is the cumulative emissions of 
greenhouse gases24, especially CO2 (Allen et al. 2009, 
IPCC 2007b, Matthews and Caldeira 2008, Matthews 
et al. 2009, Meinshausen et al. 2009, Van Vuuren et al. 
2008). Cumulative emissions are determined by the 
annual emissions over time. In ambitious mitigation 
scenarios, the following factors play an important role in 
determining the cumulative emissions:
•	 the	year	in	which	global	emissions	peak
•	 the	emission	level	at	the	peak
•	 the	pathway	of	global	 annual	 emissions	after	
the peak.
For the same cumulative emissions, a higher and/or later 
emissions peak means faster reductions after the peak 
than for earlier and/or lower peaks in emissions.
However, all three factors are bounded by feasibility 
considerations, including economic and/or 
technological constraints (see Section 2.3). For instance, 
there are constraints on how fast high-carbon energy 
infrastructure can be replaced with low-carbon 
infrastructure (for example, coal-fired power plants with 
renewable energy production).
As a consequence, there is a limited range of 2020 
emissions that are consistent with a 2° C or 1.5° C limit, 
given current assumptions about the feasibility of 
emission pathways post 2020.
 
In addition, the probability of exceeding a particular 
temperature level varies according to the cumulative 
24  The assessments in this study include the combined effects of both 
short and long-lived greenhouse gases and forcing agents.
 
emissions level—for a higher degree of confidence in 
staying within a particular temperature limit, a lower 
cumulative emissions level is required. Pathways with 
later or higher peaks also reduce, or even eliminate, 
the “margin of error”, should future advances in climate 
science or additional evidence of the risks of climate 
change convince citizens and policymakers that more 
ambitious targets for limiting climate change are needed 
(Lowe et al. 2009).
2.3 CURREnT ESTIMATES OF FEASIBILITy
The implications of 2020 emission levels for long-
term temperature outcomes depend importantly 
on how much and how fast it is considered feasible 
to reduce emissions before, and particularly beyond 
2020. Feasibility (i.e. considerations on whether a 
particular emission pathway is possible to achieve) 
is a subjective concept that has to take into account 
several factors: technological, economic, political 
and social. Technological feasibility refers to whether 
technologies exist, and can be scaled-up fast enough, to 
produce enough low-carbon energy to meet demand. 
Economic feasibility refers to whether or not the cost 
of doing so is considered prohibitively high. Political 
feasibility includes factors, such as whether the assumed 
extent of participation in emission reduction efforts 
across countries (or economic sectors) is plausible and 
whether the time required to develop institutions that 
would facilitate this participation is reasonable. Finally, 
social feasibility refers to whether measures to control 
emissions would be acceptable to society, for example 
after taking into account their implications for equity or 
for non-climate environmental consequences.
IAMs can account for several of these factors by 
representing inertia of technological and social systems. 
Examples include assumptions about the maximum 
feasible technology penetration rates, maximum 
cost, feasibility of specific system configurations, and 
maximum speed of behavioural changes.
The results of IAMs are, therefore, helpful in informing 
our view on feasibility and, hence, are the primary source 
of quantitative information used in this assessment. 
However, it should be noted that they do not set “hard 
laws” on feasibility. On the one hand, they are based 
on our current understanding of technological and 
economic constraints, which could change; therefore the 
range of emission pathways considered feasible could 
shrink or expand over time. For instance, the models do 
not include the possibility of the development of “game-
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changing” new technologies currently unforeseen. On 
the other hand, feasibility also depends on societal and 
political factors that are not typically considered in IAMs 
(Bosetti et al. 2010, Ha-Duong et al. 1997, Ha-Duong and 
Treich 2004). Recently, IAM studies have explored the 
influence of participation of different countries in model 
comparison studies (Clarke et al. 2009) and this could 
reduce the range of pathways considered feasible.
One important factor determining the maximum 
emission reduction rate is the lifetime of machinery and 
infrastructure: this can be decades or even centuries for 
building stock and urban infrastructure; around 40 years 
for power stations; 20 to 40 years for manufacturing 
equipment; up to 20 years for heating devices; and 10 
to 20 years for passenger vehicles, but much longer for 
transport infrastructure (Philibert 2007). These lifetimes 
are critically important, if mitigation strategies aim to 
avoid premature replacement of capital and the high 
costs associated with it. For illustration, carbon dioxide 
emissions from energy and industry would decline by 
about 3 per cent per year if no new emission-producing 
infrastructure were to be built (adapted from Davis et 
al. 2010). In the assessed IAM literature on mitigation 
scenarios, the highest average rate of total emission 
reduction over the next 4 to 5 decades is about 3.5 per 
cent per year (den Elzen et al. 2010)25. 
To put this in context, a global CO2 emission reduction 
rate of 3 per cent would require a rate of decrease in 
emissions per unit of GDP (or decarbonization rate) of 
almost 6 per cent for an assumed annual rate of global 
GDP growth of 3 per cent. Ranger et al. (2010) show 
that there is very little precedent for such high rates 
of emission reductions amongst the top 25 emitters. 
The global decarbonization rate over the 1969-2009 
period was 1 per cent on average, although this was 
in the absence of strong international climate policies. 
In a society that places the highest possible priority on 
reducing emissions, the normal capital turnover rate 
could possibly be increased. However, some studies 
suggest that higher annual reduction rates of up to about 
6 per cent per year are possible for a limited time in certain 
circumstances, but only when the conditions have been 
put in place for rapid investment in decarbonization 
of the energy sector (e.g. Edenhofer et al. 2009). The 
feasibility of achieving emission reduction rates of 3 per 
cent or more per year for CO2 emissions from energy and 
industry is highly uncertain, given political and societal 
25 In our set of re-analysed IAM pathways, the fastest reduction rate of 
energy and industrial emissions is 3.6 per cent (O’Neill et al. 2009). In 
this report, we usually refer to reduction rates of energy and industrial 
carbon dioxide emissions, rather than total emission reduction rates.  
constraints and the fact that emission reductions are not 
likely to be distributed evenly across nations.
Lastly, it should be noted that most of the pathways 
consistent with the temperature limits in this report 
include negative global emissions of CO2 from energy 
and industry beginning in the 2060s and 2070s. 
Understanding the feasibility of negative emissions is 
therefore crucial for assessing the chances of meeting the 
2° C and 1.5° C temperature limits: if negative emissions 
of a significant scale are not possible, then our options 
for meeting the targets are significantly constrained. 
Global net negative emissions occur when the removal 
of CO2 from the atmosphere due to anthropogenic 
activities is greater than the anthropogenic emissions 
into it. One way to achieve this (and assumed by many 
IAMs) is through the implementation of bioenergy 
combined with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). 
This involves using large amounts of biomass to 
generate energy, and then capturing and safely storing 
underground or elsewhere CO2 released by combustion. 
Since biomass takes up CO2 from the atmosphere in 
the course of its growth, and since the CO2 taken up is 
stored underground, BECCS in effect removes CO2 from 
the atmosphere (Azar et al. 2010). Direct air capture of 
CO2 and other technologies may also lead to negative 
emissions, but are currently not included in IAMs. The 
feasibility of large scale bioenergy systems, whether used 
in conjunction with CCS or not, is related to factors such 
as availability of land and water, impacts on biodiversity, 
and biomass productivity. 
2.4 WHAT EMISSIOn PATHWAyS AnD 
EMISSIOn LEVELS In 2020 ARE COnSISTEnT 
WITH 2° C AnD 1.5° C LIMITS? 
This section explains how the re-analysed IAM 
pathways relate to 2020 emission levels, and how 
these levels relate to the subsequent evolution 
of pathways that are consistent with the 2° C and 
1.5° C temperature limits. Findings from “stylized” 
pathways are also discussed, because they add to 
our understanding of emission pathways consistent 
with temperature limits. It is shown that expected 
levels of global emissions in 2020 carry important 
information for policymakers about the feasibility, 
scale and magnitude of actions required afterwards 
to limit global temperature increase.
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Figure 1: Overview of global greenhouse gas emissions in GtCO2e/year of IAM emission pathways (panels a, c, e 
and g at the left) and “stylized” emission pathways (panels b, d, f and h at the right). These are pathways that have 
been re-analysed in this assessment and that meet the 1.5° and 2° C temperature limits with a particular probability. 
The area in between the pathways is shaded for clarity. Green pathways meet the temperature limits with a “likely” 
chance (greater than 66 per cent) (panels a, b, e and f) and orange/yellow pathways with a “medium” chance (50 to 
66 per cent) (panels c, d, g and h). The methods used to produce the Figure are detailed in Box 2a. Note that these 
are global total emissions (land use, energy and industry). Later in the chapter we refer to negative emissions of 
CO2 from energy and industry only, hence the discrepancy between the number of pathways showing negative 
emissions in this chart and in Table 1
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Box 2a: Method for identifying emission pathways 
For the purpose of this assessment we collected a total of 223 emission pathways. Of these 126 were IAM emission 
pathways published by 15 modelling groups26, of which 113 explored low greenhouse gas concentration 
targets while taking into account some assumptions about technological and socio-economic inertia, whereas 
the remaining 13 represent scenarios without strong mitigation policy. These IAM pathways had varied rates 
of emission reductions across regions, sectors and gases in order to minimise costs. Of the 223 pathways, 97 
were “stylized” pathways27 which did not make assumptions about technological and economic feasibility, but 
identified the emission pathways that corresponded to particular temperature targets based on carbon cycle and 
climate models.
We have evaluated the probability of each of the pathways meeting a  2o C and 1.5o C limit. In order to make 
results more comparable, we have adjusted the pathways so that they have the same emission levels in 2000 
and 2005. Emissions for these years were taken from the multi-gas emissions inventory developed as part of the 
“Representative Concentration Pathways” (RCPs) scenario exercise (Granier et al. submitted, Meinshausen et al. 
submitted). When a particular pathway lacked the emissions of a particular substance (e.g. sulphate aerosols, 
organic carbon, black carbon or atmospheric ozone precursors), these data were taken from the RCP3-PD scenario 
(van Vuuren et al. submitted). It should be noted that the RCP-3PD scenario assumes strong environmental 
policies and this is consistent with the aim of this report to identify mitigation pathways that stay within a 2° C 
or 1.5° C limit. Ozone depleting substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol are assumed to follow a gradual 
phase-out during the twenty-first century.
The temperature calculations of the harmonised emission pathways were made more comparable by using 
a single model MAGICC  6.3 (Meinshausen et al. 2009, Meinshausen et al. 2008) to calculate the probabilistic 
temperature outcome up to 2100 for each emission pathway.
A joint probability distribution of the most important climate response uncertainties has been used, with climate 
sensitivity uncertainties closely reflecting the estimate provided by the IPCC (IPCC 2007c)28.This distribution gives 
the probability of a particular response of temperature to emissions. Because a probability distribution rather 
than a single number is used for the climate sensitivity factor, temperature outcomes are expressed in terms of 
probabilities, for example, “emission pathways with a medium chance of staying below a 2° C limit”. The emission 
pathways were put into different categories according to temperature limits (1.5° and 2° C), their probability of 
meeting the limit (50-66 per cent, greater than 66 per cent), the assumed technologies (e.g. negative emissions 
or not), and whether they are “stylized” or IAM pathways.
We also performed a sensitivity analysis by analysing 11 recalibrated versions of the climate model to explore 
alternative values of the climate sensitivity distribution that have been published (see Meinshausen et al. 2009). 
For emission pathways that give around a “medium” chance of meeting a 2° C limit during the twenty-first 
century, the sensitivity studies lead to a spread in the median projected temperature of only ±0.2° C.
 It is important to note that although we have harmonised the pathways for comparability, some uncertainties 
remain, for example, about future levels of anthropogenic aerosols, soot and organic carbon.
The climate model used in this study has previously been validated and shown to credibly reproduce observed 
climate changes when driven by historic emissions or forcings. However, like other climate models it does not 
include all of the physical processes that could affect the real climate in future. For instance, there is no treatment 
of extra carbon release from melting permafrosts.
Our quantitative assessment of IAM pathways found a notable number and range of emissions that are consistent 
with the temperature limits of interest in this report, even after re-analysis. In the text we focus on the median 
and range of the “majority of results”, with the range corresponding to the 20th to 80th percentile of outcomes. 
Results at either end of this range are not necessarily invalid or incorrect, and are also discussed in the text.
26 Studies underlying the IAM emission pathways can be found in the literature (Clarke et al. 2007, Clarke et al. 2009, Edenhofer et al. 2009, 
Edenhofer et al. 2010, Fujino et al. 2006, IPCC 2007a, O’Neill et al. 2009, Riahi et al. 2007, Smith and Wigley 2006, van Vuuren et al. 2007, Wise 
et al. 2009).
27 Studies underlying the “stylized” pathways are found in the literature (Bowen and Ranger 2009, den Elzen et al. 2007, Lowe et al. 2009, 
Meinshausen et al.2009, Ranger et al. 2010, Rogelj et al. 2010a, Rogelj et al. 2010b, Schaeffer and Hare 2009), as well as the methodology 
used in this report for possible complementary pathways (Meinshausen et al. 2006).
28 The climate sensitivity distribution used for the analysis throughout this report is the “illustrative default” case as described in Meinshaus-
en et al. (2009).
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Assessment of the pathways consistent with 2° C 
Of all IAM emission pathways that were included in our 
quantitative assessment, 9 were found to have a “likely” 
chance (greater than 66 per cent) of limiting warming 
to less than 2° C above pre-industrial levels. The results 
of our quantitative assessment (Table 1) show that the 
majority of emission pathways with a “likely” chance of 
meeting the 2° C limit show the following characteristics: 
•	 A	 peak	 in	 global	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	
before 2020 and in general earlier in the decade; 
•	 2020	 global	 greenhouse	 gas	 emission	 levels	
of 44 GtCO2e (median), with a range
29 of 39-44 
GtCO2e
30;
•	 Average	annual	reduction	rates	of	CO2 emissions 
from energy and industry between 2020 and 
2050 of around 3 per cent (range of 2.2-3.1 per 
cent) 
•	 2050	 global	 emissions	 that	 are	 50-60	 per	 cent	
below their 1990 levels; and
•	 In	 most	 cases,	 negative	 CO2 emissions from 
energy and industry beginning in the 2060s to 
2070s31.
A further 18 IAM pathways were found to have a 
“medium” chance (50-66 per cent) of staying below a 
temperature increase of 2° C. The 2020 emission levels 
are similar (median 45 GtCO2e, range 42-46), while the 
emission reduction rate between 2020 and 2050 is lower 
(2.5 compared with 3 per cent per year), Half of these 
“medium” chance pathways involve net negative CO2 
emissions from energy and industry, beginning between 
the mid-2050s and mid-2070s32.
In general, “medium” chance pathways for 2° C differ 
from “likely” chance pathways either by having higher 
emission levels in 2020 but the same rates of emission 
reductions afterwards, or having the same emission 
levels in 2020 but slower reduction rates afterwards. 
“Likely” chance pathways also rely more often on 
negative emissions.
29 Ranges here, and in the following text, refer to the “majority of 
results”, that is, between the 20th and 80th percentile of results, 
unless otherwise specified.
30 Note, these are rounded numbers. If numbers with one decimal 
place were shown it would be apparent that the upper end of the 
range is above slightly above 44 and the median slightly below. The 
fact that both the median and the upper end of the range round to 44 
indicates that many of the estimates were close to 44. 
31 2 of the 9 scenarios do not rely on negative CO2 emissions from 
energy and industry to meet the 2° C limit and are associated with low 
2020 emission levels of 26 and 36 GtCO2e. Note that Figure 1 does not 
depict this level of negative emissions since that figure shows global 
total emissions rather than CO2 emissions from energy and industry, 
which are described here.
32 Note that Figure 1 does not depict this level of negative emissions 
since that figure shows global total emissions rather than CO2 
emissions from energy and industry, which are described here.
The re-analysed set of “stylized” pathways (not included 
in Table 1) shows that, if emissions ranged up to 
50 GtCO2e in 2020, average reduction rates of up to 4 per 
cent per year would be needed in the 2020-2050 period 
to meet the 2° C limit (Rogelj et al. 2010b, Schaeffer and 
Hare 2009)33. The high end of these reduction rates is 
currently not found in the IAM literature. These pathways 
also require large negative emissions in the second half 
of this century to meet the temperature limit.
Another important message from analysing IAM 
emission pathways is that they suggest that it is 
economically and technologically feasible to achieve 
substantial emission reductions. This implies that it is 
possible to reach emission levels consistent with a 2° C 
target (i.e. approximately 44 GtCO2e in 2020).
To have a higher confidence of staying below a 2° C 
limit, it seems essential to deploy negative emission 
technologies (to reduce CO2 from energy and industry) 
in the second half of the century, that is, unless emission 
levels are significantly below 44 GtCO2e  in 2020.
Assessment of the pathways consistent with  
1.5° C 
None of the IAM or “stylized” pathways in this assessment 
lead to temperature increases below 1.5° C throughout 
this century. One IAM study published by Magné et al. 
(2010) depicts an emission pathway with a “medium” 
chance of achieving the 1.5° C target by the end of the 
century and has 2020 emissions of 41  GtCO2e. These 
results suggest that after a small (0.1° C) transient 
overshoot of the temperature limit of about half a 
century, the temperature increase by the end of the 
twenty-first century could be brought back to below 1.5° 
C with a “medium” chance. In general, the IAM pathways 
that meet the 2° C limit with a “likely” chance also meet 
the 1.5° C target by 2100 but with a lower probability 
of 30 per cent (range 27-35 per cent for the 20th-80th 
percentile) and with a median temperature peak at 
some point in the twenty-first century of between 1.6° 
C and 1.7° C.
A few studies have used stylized pathways to explore 
the achievement of a 1.5° C limit in more detail (Ranger 
et al. 2010, Schaeffer and Hare 2009). The stylized 
pathways included in this assessment suggest that 
limiting warming to 1.5° C by 2100 (with a “medium” 
to “likely” chance) means 2020 emission levels of 40 to 
48 GtCO2e (20th-80th percentile range), and reduction 
rates of 3 to 5 per cent per year in the 2020-2050 period 
(Schaeffer and Hare 2009). These pathways would also 
employ negative CO2 emissions in the second half of 
this century. As discussed in Section 3, the feasibility of 
achieving such high emission reduction rates is difficult 
33 In the literature, two studies of “stylized pathways” have explicitly 
focused on the question of emission pathways consistent with the 2° 
C limit (Bowen and Ranger 2009 and Meinshausen et al.et al. 2009). 
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to assess and they are not found in the current literature 
of IAM results. 
Results from low and high ends of emissions 
range in 2020 
In the text we have focused on the “majority of results” of 
the re-analysed IAM pathway set (the median and 20th 
to 80th percentile range). However, results outside this 
range are also valid and provide useful information. 
We first consider the high end of the range of expected 
emissions in 2020 represented by results from van 
Vuuren et al. 2007 for a “likely” chance to stay below a 
2ºC limit, and O’Neill et al. 2009 for a “medium” chance. 
At this end of the range emissions are 48  GtCO2e. For 
a “likely” chance to achieve the temperature target, 
average reduction rates between 2020 and 2050 (of CO2 
emissions from energy and industry) are 3.2 per cent per 
year, and for a medium chance 3.6 per cent per year34. 
These set the upper range of emissions and reduction 
rates.
The low end of the range shows that relatively low 
emission reduction rates between 2020 and 2050 are 
sufficient to reach the temperature limit, if 2020 emission 
levels are at the low end of the range. Some pathways, 
for example in Barker and Scrieciu (2010) and Clarke et 
al. (2009), indicate 2020 emission levels of 26-36 GtCO2e. 
These results suggest that it may be technologically 
and economically feasible to reduce global emissions 
by 2020 by substantially more than the majority of IAM 
pathways assume.
34 The seemingly contradictory difference in reduction rates is 
explained by the different shape of the post 2020 emission pathways. 
Van Vuuren et al.et al. (2007) show emissions declining shortly after 
2020 and hence have a lower rate of reduction with a high likelihood 
of limiting temperature increase than O’Neill et al.et al. (2009), which 
decline later but faster and deeper.
Table 1: Re-analysis results of IAM pathways with 2° C characteristics. 
2° C pathways Number       Peak year 2020 total emission levels Average energy and industry    Decade in which global 
               of                 period*          (GtCO2e)**          CO2 reduction rate from energy and industry 
               pathways                 2020 to 2050 (% of 2000 CO2 emissions turn   
               levels / yr)   negative 
               
 Median Range*** Median Range*** Median Range***
“Likely” chance (greater than 66 per cent) of staying below 2° C during twenty-first century
Without negative CO2 2 2010-20 31 26-{28-34}-36 0.9 0.6-{0.7-1.1}-1.2 N/A N/A 
emissions from energy 
and industry 
With  negative CO2 7 2010-20 44 41-{44-44}-48 3.0 2.8-{2.9-3.2}-3.2 2070 2050-{2060- 
emissions from energy        2070}-2080 
and industry 
Full IAM set 9 2010-20 44 26-{39-44}-48 3.0 0.6-{2.2-3.1}-3.2 N/A N/A
“Medium” chance (50 to 66 per cent) of staying below 2° C during twenty-first century
Without  negative CO2 9 2010-20 44 34-{42-45}-48 2.4 0.8-{2.2-2.7}-3.1 N/A N/A 
emissions from energy 
and industry 
With  negative CO2 9 2010-20 45 41-{42-46}-48 2.5 1.3-{2.3-3.2}-3.6 2060 2050-{2050- 
emissions from energy        2060}-2070  
and industry 
Full IAM set 18 2010-20 45 34-{42-46}-48 2.5 0.8-{2.2-3.0}-3.6 N/A N/A
* Because IAM pathways provide emissions data only for 5-year or 10-year increments, the encompassing period in which the peak in global emissions 
occurs is given. The peak year period given here reflects the 20th-80th percentile range. Note that pathways with a ”likely” chance show peaks earlier in the 
decade, whilst those with a ‘medium’ chance are spread across the whole decade.
** For comparison: the median of current (2010) emissions in the harmonised IAM set is 48 GtCO2e.
*** Range is presented as the (minimum value - {20th percentile - 80th percentile} - maximum value)
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Box 2b. Overshooting of 2° C Temperature limits
Model results show that temperature trends could overshoot and then drop again below temperature limits as 
a result of natural “sinks” acting to gradually reduce the atmospheric burden of the greenhouse gases over time. 
However, since this process occurs slowly, it is expected that once temperatures overshoot a target, they will take 
decades to drop below the target (Lowe et al. 2009). This process could be accelerated if negative CO2 emissions 
were achieved as discussed earlier (Azar et al. 2006, Azar et al. 2010). 
Overshoot pathways often arise in three different contexts: (1) deliberate policy choice to minimise mitigation 
costs; (2) failure to meet certain emission targets or goals; or (3) late participation by all major emitters in global 
mitigation efforts (Clarke et al. 2009, van Vliet et al. 2009). While deliberate overshoot may minimise mitigation 
costs over time, it does run the risk of lock-in of further fossil fuel use and thereby limiting the rate at which 
emissions can decline in subsequent years. 
In the assessed IAM pathway set, four pathways have a temporary temperature overshoot before dropping 
below 2° C again.35 All of these pathways have global negative CO2 emissions to help achieve the target. In these 
pathways the constraint on 2020 emissions is relaxed slightly, and the peak is postponed to 2020 and beyond. 
Delayed action may have economic benefits (as noted above), but also has risks associated with the higher, albeit 
temporary, temperatures. These include higher mitigation costs over the long term and later and larger damages 
from climate change impacts. Huntingford and Lowe (2007) argue that there are significant risks from exceeding 
temperature limits during overshoot scenarios, due to uncertainty about so-called tipping points. An additional 
risk of overshooting temperature limits is that positive feedbacks, not known in advance, might result in a larger 
temperature increase than anticipated.
35 In addition to the 27 of the 126 IAM pathways that are able to meet the 2° C limit during the twenty-first century without a temperature 
overshoot and with a probability higher than 50 per cent.
2.5 GAPS In KnOWLEDGE AnD FURTHER 
WORK
The ability to assess pathways consistent with specific 
temperature limits depends on understanding both the 
climate system and the global energy system, as well as 
the ways in which each responds to change over time.
Important uncertainties exist in our understanding 
of the climate system. We have accounted for some 
of this uncertainty by examining the probability of 
meeting particular temperature limits. Future shifts 
in the underlying probability distributions, as a result 
of improved understanding of parameters and/or 
feedbacks in the climate system, could change the 
expected probability with which a certain pathway 
would meet a specified temperature limit. There is 
also much uncertainty around the issue of how rapidly 
temperatures may be reduced after overshooting, and 
the reversibility of associated climate system changes. 
Our understanding of the feasibility of pathways is also 
incomplete. Many of the pathways assessed here were 
not designed to specifically investigate the limits to 
feasible emission reductions, and none of the studies 
were designed explicitly to explore the full range 
of emissions in 2020 that would be consistent with 
long-term temperature limits. Research specifically 
targeted to address these questions would improve our 
understanding of which pathways can feasibly achieve 
temperature targets.
In addition, emission pathways now considered infeasible 
could become feasible if variables such as population 
growth rate, consumption of energy, aerosol emissions, 
economic growth and technological developments 
turn out to be different from the assumptions used in 
current studies. Other factors could also make emission 
pathways feasible such as the willingness of society to 
take “extreme” action by retiring energy infrastructure 
before the end of its useful lifetime, or by making 
significant lifestyle changes. Similarly, the pathways 
thought to be feasible in this report could in practice be 
unachievable, if, for example, participation in mitigation 
efforts was limited across sectors and countries, or if 
technological and socio-economic barriers were more 
severe than expected.
Given these uncertainties, it will be crucial over time 
to re-evaluate the emission pathways consistent with 
particular temperature limits and to inform the policy 
community accordingly.
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3. What are the 
expected global 
emissions in 2020? 
Lead authors: Niklas Höhne, Chris Taylor
Contributing authors: Claudine Chen, Rob Dellink, 
Michel den Elzen, Jørgen Fenhann, Claudio Gesteira, 
Kelly Levin, Emanuele Massetti, Caspar Olausson, 
Murray Ward, Zhao Xiusheng
3.1 InTRODUCTIOn 
Nearly 140 countries have associated themselves with 
the Copenhagen Accord and 80 countries, representing 
about 80 per cent of global emissions, have appended 
targets (Annex I countries) and/or mitigation actions 
(non-Annex I countries). The aim of this chapter is to 
assess the published analyses and to explore what these 
targets and actions (collectively referred to as “pledges”)36 
are likely to lead to in terms of 2020 emissions37. Three 
appendices to this Chapter are available online38. 
Appendix 1 provides detail on the differences between 
the four cases and the uncertainties around them. 
Appendix 2 provides a country-by-country analysis of 
the pledges of the largest emitting countries. Appendix 
3 compares the modelling groups’ findings and details 
the adjustments made to their data to ensure consistent 
comparisons. Chapter 4 then goes on to combine these 
results with those of the previous chapter on emission 
36 Please note that the pledges incorporated in the Copenhagen 
Accord in early 2010 have not changed through the 2010 
negotiations’ cycle
37 Whilst this assessment focuses on the pledges submitted to the 
Copenhagen Accord, in one instance, for Indonesia, modelling groups 
have analysed a conditional pledge announced by the President but 
not included in the Copenhagen Accord submission. The impact of 
that pledge is included in the two conditional pledge cases presented 
in this Chapter.
38 www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport
pathways in order to assess the extent to which these 
pledges are consistent with a 2° C or 1.5° C pathway.
Estimating 2020 emissions, based on countries’ pledges 
or submissions to the Copenhagen Accord, is not a 
simple task. This Chapter explains in detail that it involves 
inter alia: information on the historical, current and 
future growth of countries’ emissions; interpretations in 
the cases in which countries have submitted a range of 
pledges; assumptions on the precise meaning of those 
pledges where countries have not been specific; and 
uncertainties in the underlying data used by modelling 
groups. 
Therefore, we separate the emission estimates that 
are driven by distinct policy choices, either nationally 
or in the negotiations, from what is driven by different 
modelling assumptions. We first present the results of 
this analysis and then move on to explore the modelling 
uncertainties around them. 
3.2 GLOBAL AGGREGATE EMISSIOnS 
RESULTInG FROM THE PLEDGES
For this assessment, the analyses of 13 modelling 
groups have been reviewed39. Of these, nine groups 
have performed a global analysis and four have focused 
on either Annex I or a subset of other countries. These 
groups have made different assumptions about how the 
conditionality of pledges plays out in global emissions. 
Hence, adjustments have been made to the various 
estimates, in order to facilitate a meaningful comparison. 
The adjustments made are briefly explained in Box 3a 
and detailed in the appendices available online40. The 
aim has been to construct a set of pledge cases with 
estimates of different 2020 emission levels.  
39 Namely: Climate Action Tracker (CAT) by Ecofys, Climate Analytics 
and PIK; Climate Interactive (the C-ROADS model); Climate Strategies; 
FEEM (the WITCH model); IIASA (the GAINS model); Grantham 
Research Institute (LSE); OECD (the ENV-linkages model); PBL 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (the FAIR model); 
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE); Project Catalyst; 
the AVOID research programme (led by the Met Office Hadley Centre); 
UNEP Risoe; and the World Resources Institute (WRI).
40 www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport
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Box 3a: Explanation of the four pledge cases and calculation method
In this chapter we have constructed four distinct pledge cases that could result from different policy choices of 
Governments or from different outcomes of the negotiations. These four cases are combinations of the following 
two interdependent factors:
Unconditional versus conditional pledges: We have distinguished between countries’ unconditional and 
conditional pledges. Several industrialized countries have made pledges conditional on actions from other 
countries or the passing of domestic legislation, and developing countries’ pledges are often conditional on 
finance or technology transfer. We have made common assumptions as to whether a country’s pledge is deemed 
conditional or not (detailed in Appendix 2) and applied that to all modelling groups’ estimates. We have then 
summed the estimates to create a global total, which also includes international transport emissions. Note that 
where a country does not have an unconditional pledge (e.g. Canada, Japan, US and South Africa) the business-
as-usual estimate for that country is assumed for the unconditional case reflected in Figure 2. 41 
“Lenient” versus “strict” rules: We have adjusted these results to take into account the maximum42 impact of 
two unresolved issues in the negotiations: LULUCF accounting and the use of surplus emissions units. These 
issues have the potential to displace mitigation action in other sectors and thus lead to higher global emissions 
in 2020. The adjustments made are based on a review of existing literature and are reflected in the two “lenient” 
pledge cases (the “strict rules” cases do not include any impact from these issues). Specifically, for LULUCF 
accounting we have applied a maximum expected impact of 4.2 per cent of 1990 Annex I emissions annually in 
2020 (approximately 0.8 GtCO2e). We assumed that credits of this magnitude would be given for carbon removals 
from existing forests or other sinks that would have occurred without further policy interventions (see Box 3b). 
For surplus emissions units, we have made two adjustments: the first for the expected impact of surplus emissions 
units “carried over” or “banked” from the first commitment period and used in the next. We have applied the 
maximum expected impact of 1.3 GtCO2e on 2020 emissions. The second adjustment is to account for any new 
surplus units that are expected to be generated in the next commitment period as a result of the pledges from 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus remaining above business-as-usual. The expected impact of these depends on the 
modelling assumptions of each group and ranges up to 1 GtCO2e in 2020.
43 A more detailed description of these 
issues and adjustments is available in Appendix 1.
In order to make consistent comparisons across modelling groups, we have had to adjust the global emission 
estimates of some groups to ensure that all sectors and countries are covered. In the case where data were 
missing (e.g. international transport emissions), we have added the median value of other modelling groups’ 
data. In addition, in order to ensure a consistent comparison with the results from Chapter 2 we have harmonised 
the data for the same 2005 emissions used in that chapter. These adjustments result in slightly different emission 
levels for each of the groups compared with those included in their publications. Appendix 3 provides more detail 
on the differences between modelling groups’ findings and the adjustments made.
In Figure 2 we show median results for each case to reflect the clustering of results from modelling groups. In the 
text we report the 20th and 80th percentile range to reflect the majority of the results. 
41 Given that these countries are implementing and/or planning some domestic policies, this is a very cautious assumption 
(e.g. for the USA see Bianco and Litz (2010)).
42 A maximum impact is taken in order to show an upper bound for what 2020 emissions could be under these cases.
43 Note that in computing the emissions for the “lenient” cases we have applied the adjustments noted in this box for LULUCF 
accounting and surplus emission units. H owever, if those adjustments resulted in Annex I emissions being higher than 
their business-as-usual projections then we capped emissions at that level. Hence the adjustments noted in this box are not 
additive.
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To estimate emissions expected in 2020 we have to make 
assumptions about the policy choices of governments. 
Since these choices are uncertain we specify four 
different cases, each giving a different combination of 
choices (Box 3a). The results for emissions are as follows 
(and are summarised in Figure 2): 
As a reference point, without pledges global greenhouse 
gas emissions may increase from 45 GtCO2e in 2005 
to around 56 GtCO2e in 2020 (with a range
44 of 54-60 
GtCO2e) according to business-as-usual projections. 
– Case 1 – “Unconditional pledges, lenient rules”: 
this case would occur if countries stick to their 
lower-ambition pledges and are subject to 
“lenient” accounting rules. By this we mean 
that Annex I countries maximise the use of 
surplus emission units and “lenient LULUCF 
credits” (see Box 3b) to meet their targets. In 
this case, the median estimate of emissions in 
2020 is 53 GtCO2e per year, with a range of 52-
57 GtCO2e.
– Case 2 – “Unconditional pledges, strict rules”: 
This case would occur if countries stick to their 
lower-ambition pledges and are subject to 
“strict” accounting rules. By this we mean that 
the use of surplus units and “lenient LULUCF 
credits” is assumed to be zero. In this case, the 
median estimate of emissions in 2020 is 52 
GtCO2e, with a range of 50-55 GtCO2e.
– Case 3 – “Conditional pledges, lenient rules”: 
This case would occur if countries moved to 
their higher-ambition pledges (as conditions 
are either met or relaxed), but are subject to 
“lenient” accounting rules (as explained in 
case 1 above). This case was included because 
some of the more ambitious pledges of Annex 
I countries are conditional on some use of 
these credits or carry-over of surplus units 
(e.g. European Union, Russia). In this case, the 
median estimate of emissions in 2020 is 51 
GtCO2e, with a range of 49-53 GtCO2e. 
– Case 4 – “Conditional pledges, strict rules”: This 
case would occur if countries moved to their 
higher-ambition pledges, and are subject to 
“strict” accounting rules (as explained in case 
2 above). In this case, the median estimate of 
emissions in 2020 is 49 GtCO2e, with a range of 
47-51 GtCO2e.
It is worth noting that there is the possibility of higher 
global emissions if international offsets are counted 
towards both industrialized and developing countries’ 
44 Henceforth, in this chapter all ranges refer to the 20th-80th 
percentile, unless otherwise specified. 
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pledges (the so-called “double counting” of offsets). It 
should also be noted that in some countries the impact 
of existing domestic policies or national plans could 
lead to lower emissions than the conditional pledges 
submitted to the Copenhagen Accord. International 
climate finance could also leverage further mitigation 
and lower emissions. All these issues have been analysed 
and found to have a significant effect on 2020 emissions. 
However, they are not included in any of these cases but 
are discussed as additional factors in Section 3.4 below.
From the analysis of these four cases it is interesting 
to note that the international policy options being 
discussed in the UNFCCC negotiations, and inherent 
in these cases, can significantly reduce the level of 
emissions in 2020. The most ambitious of the cases (case 
4) is expected to be 7 GtCO2e lower than business-as-
usual emissions (range of 6-9 GtCO2e lower).
For Annex I countries, in the least ambitious case 
(“unconditional pledges, lenient rules”), emissions are 
estimated to be 6 per cent above 1990 levels (range of 
1-12 per cent above) or equivalent to business-as-usual 
emissions in 2020. In fact, in many cases the use by Annex 
I countries of surplus units and “lenient LULUCF credits” 
provides more overall emission units than needed. This 
could result in higher emissions after 2020 if those units 
were to be banked for use in the following period. 
In the most ambitious case (“conditional pledges, strict 
rules”), Annex I emissions in 2020 are expected to 
be 16 per cent below 1990 levels (range of 15-18 per 
cent below) and 20 per cent below business-as-usual 
emissions (range of 17-26 per cent). 
For non-Annex I countries, in the least ambitious case 
(“unconditional pledges”) emissions are estimated to 
be 7 per cent lower than business-as-usual emissions 
(range of 6-8 per cent lower). In the most ambitious case 
(“conditional pledges”), non-Annex I emissions are 9 per 
cent lower than business-as-usual (range of 8-9 per cent 
lower). 
This implies that the aggregate Annex I countries’ 
emission goals are less ambitious than the 25-40 
per cent reduction by 2020 (compared with 1990) 
suggested in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC 
2007a). Collectively the non-Annex I countries’ goals are 
less ambitious than the 15-30 per cent deviation from 
business-as-usual which is also commonly used as a 
benchmark (den Elzen and Höhne 2008, 2010). Whilst 
these values are helpful as a benchmark, it should be 
noted that, as described in chapters 2 and 4, various 
other emission pathways are consistent with the 2° C 
and 1.5° C temperature limits.
The cases presented in Figure 2 will be taken forward 
into the next chapter, which compares global emissions 
projections for 2020 with the emission pathways 
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associated with limiting temperature rise to 2° C or 
1.5° C. There are many possible combinations of the 
uncertainties considered in the preceding section that 
may lead to different 2020 emissions. However, the four 
cases presented above represent a reasonable summary 
of the potential low and high ambition outcomes that 
may be associated with the pledges. 
Figure 2. Global emissions resulting from the four pledge cases, as found by different modelling groups 
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Several options exist for policymakers to influence 
the final global 2020 emission level by delivering 
on their highest announced ambition and ensuring 
that accounting rules do not displace mitigation, and 
by finding ways to deliver further ambition either 
domestically, through finance or in sectors not currently 
covered.
n 4 9 9 9 9 9 9
High 37.9 45.0 61.6 60.6 59.4 57.2 54.9
80th 37.8 45.0 59.9 57.1 55.1 53.0 50.9
Median 37.7 45.0 55.5 53.0 51.9 51.4 49.0
20th 36.1 45.0 54.3 51.8 50.3 48.8 46.7
Low 33.7 45.0 52.8 51.4 49.7 47.7 45.2
Global emissions, including LULUCF emissions GtCO2e/yr
All emissions in this figure and chapter refer to GtCO2e (gigatonnes or billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent)—the global warming 
potential-weighted sum of the six Kyoto greenhouse gases, that is, CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6, including LULUCF CO2 emissions.
n = number of studies; High = maximum of full range; Low = minimum of full range; 20th-80th = 20th and 80th percentile values of the 
range. In the set of studies examined in this report, nine modelling groups have analysed the impact of pledges at the global level, while 
four have analysed only a subset of countries.
Please note the following :
1. The data presented in the table have been harmonised to a common emissions level in 2005 (45 GtCO2e) in order to make these data 
more comparable to results in Chapter 2.
2. The range in 1990 emissions stems from the use of different data sources and assumptions especially for non-Annex I countries.
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3.3 AnALySIS OF DIFFEREnCES BETWEEn 
ESTIMATES
The range between modelling groups’ estimates can be 
split into three categories: 
1) Differences between the four pledge cases,
2) Differences between estimates for the same 
pledge case, and 
3) Other factors that could affect emissions 
More detail on each of these issues and, where 
appropriate, the sources of estimates can be found 
online45 in Appendix 1. Figure 3 summarises the impact 
of these differences on the emissions of the four pledge 
cases, together with the further uncertainties described 
in the next section.
1) Differences between the four pledge cases 
The four cases presented in Figure 2 are characterised 
by different assumptions on the conditionality of both 
Annex I and non-Annex I countries’ pledges, LULUCF 
accounting rules and on the use of surplus units from 
the first commitment period and the possible creation 
of new surplus in the future. An overview of the impact 
of these assumptions is provided below – Appendix 1 
has more details:
Unconditional versus conditional pledges
If countries were to move from unconditional to 
conditional pledges global emissions would be around 
2-3 GtCO2e lower (with a range of estimates of 2-5 
GtCO2e). This breaks down as follows (numbers in 
parentheses show the annual 2020 emission reductions 
associated with moving from case 1 to 3 or from case 2 
to 4 in Figure 2):
– Conditionality of Annex I (industrialized) 
countries (0 to -2.7 GtCO2e)
46: A significant number 
of Annex I countries have made pledges that are 
conditional on the actions of others or on the 
passing of domestic legislation. In some instances, 
countries also have unconditional pledges that 
will be implemented even if those conditions are 
not met.
45 www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport
46  2.7 GtCO2e is the m edian estimate of the studies. It does not 
exactly match the 2-3 GtCO2e reflected in the median estimate of 
Figure 2 due to the distribution of the sample for global emissions. 
See Appendix 1 for details.
– Conditionality of non-Annex I (developing) 
countries (0 to -0.7 GtCO2e)
47: As was the case for 
the Annex I countries, some non-Annex I countries 
have included a range in their submissions, with 
the upper end of the range often being conditional 
on climate finance.
“Lenient” versus “strict” rules
If the rules in the negotiations regarding the use of 
LULUCF credits and surplus emission units were to be 
set in a “strict” rather than “lenient” manner, emissions 
could be around 1-2 GtCO2e lower. This breaks down as 
follows (numbers in parentheses show the maximum 
possible increase in annual 2020 emissions reflected in 
the “lenient” cases) 
– LULUCF accounting rules (0 to +0.8 GtCO2e): 
The accounting rules that determine the extent 
to which LULUCF activities in Annex I countries 
could be used to meet their respective targets for 
the period after 2012 are still being negotiated. 
Most proposals in the negotiations would limit 
the number of “lenient LULUCF credits” by using 
historical or reference level baselines (see Box 3b).
– Surplus emission units
- Carry-over of surplus units from the first 
commitment period (0 to +1.3 GtCO2e): 
Surplus emission units can arise due to some 
countries exceeding their targets in the first 
commitment period. Countries with surplus 
units can also “bank” them and use them for 
meeting their target in a following commitment 
period post-2012, or sell them to other countries 
for their compliance.
- Creation of new surplus units in a possible 
second commitment period: (0 to +1.0 
GtCO2e)
48: Further surplus emission units 
can occur through some countries being 
allocated emission units significantly above the 
estimated business-as-usual level in a possible 
second commitment period. These units can be 
used by countries to meet their targets, or sell 
to other countries for their compliance. 
47 0.7 GtCO2e is the median estimate of the studies. It does 
not exactly match the 1-2 GtCO2e reflected in the median 
estimate of Figure 2 due to the distribution of the sample for 
global emissions. See Appendix 1 for details.
48 Note that only some modelling groups have analyzed this, 
so for many groups the assumed impact of this is zero. These 
groups assume that no extra units are assigned for targets 
above business-as-usual. However, of the six modelling 
groups that did analyse this, estimates suggest that it 
could have as much as a +1 GtC02e impact in 2020 (in the 
conditional pledge cases) – see Appendix 1 for more detail. 
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It should be noted that the above issues are 
interdependent and will result in different emission 
reductions depending on the order in which they are 
implemented. Hence the numbers presented above 
cannot simply be added together and are, therefore, not 
easily traceable to the median results reflected in Figure 
2 above49. In the reviewed studies, the total impact from 
these options (if taken together) would be a reduction in 
global emissions of 4 GtCO2e (reflected in the move from 
Case 1 to 4 in the table), with a full range across studies 
of 3-8 GtCO2e. 
2) Differences between estimates for the same pledge 
case 
Figure 2 shows that there is sometimes a large difference 
between modelling groups’ estimates of the same cases. 
The main reasons for these differences are described 
below and, where possible, the uncertainty that 
each implies for 2020 global emissions. Numbers in 
parentheses give the range of 2020 emission estimates 
in Figure 2 that could be attributed to each of these 
reasons. 
49 The distribution of the sample also complicates this, making 
it difficult to trace the numbers back to Figure 2. 
– LULUCF emissions (±4 GtCO2e): Global 
emissions from LULUCF are subject to a high 
level of uncertainty, which the IPCC estimates 
to be ±4 GtCO2e . There is particular uncertainty 
around anthropogenic emissions from peat 
lands. Lastly there is an uncertainty around how 
modelling groups treat the LULUCF emissions from 
Annex I countries, in particular. LULUCF emission 
uncertainty may be partially reflected in the range 
of estimates from different modelling groups.
– Baseline emissions (-3.4 to +2.4 GtCO2e): 
Modelling groups have used different assumptions 
regarding non-Annex I countries’ business-as-
usual emission projections and Annex I countries’ 
base year emissions (e.g. whether LULUCF CO2 is 
included or not). Moreover, the quantification of 
emission reductions due to carbon intensity targets 
(measured as improvement in emissions per unit of 
GDP) poses additional uncertainties. 
– non-covered sectors and countries (-1.1 to 
+2.7 GtCO2e): There is often a significant range in 
the emissions estimates for sectors not included 
under national pledges, such as emissions from 
international aviation and maritime transport 
(bunkers) and for countries without pledges. The 
results from different studies will vary, since some 
have explored the impact of mitigation policies of 
only a subset of countries. 
Box 3b: Further explanation of LULUCF accounting in “lenient” and “strict” rules
LULUCF accounting systems should provide credits for proven CO2 removals from new or enhanced sinks as a 
result of further policy intervention. Credits for such activities would result in CO2 removals from the atmosphere 
that could contribute to meeting, and thus should be counted towards, targets50. 
The “strict” rules cases developed in this chapter reflect situations in which LULUCF credits such as those described 
above are provided. For calculation purposes, the quantity of LULUCF credits is set to zero in these cases – although 
some credits could occur. This is accurate because the resulting target emission level is the same and therefore it 
is not necessary to estimate the possible quantity of these LULUCF credits.
In the “lenient” case, on the other hand, we assume that credits are given for CO2 removals by sinks that are 
expected to occur anyway in the absence of additional policy (e.g. from forests existing prior to 1990). Given 
that these direct-human induced emission removals are anyway part of the baseline emissions,51 the use of such 
credits would increase the estimate of 2020 global emissions. In this assessment we call such credits “lenient 
LULUCF credits”. Specifically, we assume that “lenient LULUCF credits” of up to 0.8 GtCO2e per year in 2020 could 
be generated in the “lenient” cases shown in Figure 2. See Appendix 1 for details.
50 For the same emission target these credits would allow correspondingly higher emissions in other sectors compared to 
the situation in which such LULUCF credits were not used to meet the target. In this case, from a global accounting sense, 
the final net emission level would be the same, assuming that target is met (i.e. would have a “net-zero” effect on the target)
51 Or are considered by carbon cycle models as CO2-uptake by the terrestrial biosphere in response to elevated CO2 
concentrations
THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT - CHAPTER 3
38
3) Other factors that could affect emissions 
There are a number of other factors not reflected in the 
range of estimates under each of these cases, but which 
could have a large impact on 2020 emissions. Modelling 
groups have generally not factored these issues into 
their central estimates for emissions resulting from the 
pledges—although many of the groups have estimated 
the impact of these issues separately. These factors 
include the following. Numbers in parentheses give the 
maximum annual 2020 emissions impact on the four 
cases:
– Double counting of offsets (0 to +1.3 GtCO2e): 
The potential for double counting of offsets 
towards both industrialized and developing 
country pledges, is a major source of uncertainty 
not reflected in Figure 2. This could occur if 
industrialized countries use offsets to meet their 
targets and that these same offsets also counted 
towards developing country pledges. A simple 
estimate of the risk of double counting can be 
made by assuming that 33 per cent of the deviation 
of Annex I emissions from business-as-usual is 
covered by offsets and that all of those are also 
counted towards non-Annex I goals. This would 
lead to emissions being around 1.3 GtCO2e higher 
(as compared to the “conditional pledge, strict 
rules” case)52
52 Note also that if offset credits are provided for activities that are not 
“additional” to expected baselines, even higher total emissions would 
result.
– Partial or ineffective delivery (0 to +2.0 GtCO2e): 
Any failure to carry out policies would undermine 
national efforts and lead to higher 2020 emissions; 
this would push countries’ emissions back towards 
business-as-usual. Conversely, well-designed 
policies that spur innovation and investment could 
mean that goals are exceeded. All analyses covered 
in Figure 2 assume that countries will meet their 
targets. A crude assessment of the risk of partial 
implementation can be made by assuming that 
a certain proportion of the deviation from global 
business-as-usual is not delivered. Using 25 per cent 
would lead to estimates of 2020 emissions around 
2.0 GtCO2e higher than in Figure 2 (as compared to 
the ”conditional pledge, strict rules” case). 
– International climate finance (0 to -2.5 GtCO2e): 
International climate finance could leverage further 
emission reductions beyond the conditional 
pledges of countries or in countries that have not 
yet specified mitigation actions. The upper bound 
of -2.5 GtCO2e is found by a study that assumes that 
25 per cent of Copenhagen Accord financing in 
2020 will be used for additional mitigation actions 
(Carraro and Massetti, 2010).
– Ambitious domestic policy (0 to -1.5 GtCO2e): 
Certain countries have domestic plans that include 
mitigation actions that some analysts estimate to 
be more ambitious than the Copenhagen Accord 
pledges. The three modelling groups that have 
analysed this issue estimate that this could lead to 
emissions being up to 1.5 GtCO2e lower than the 
Copenhagen Accord pledges would suggest.
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Figure 3: Summary of the maximum impact of differences and uncertainties on global 2020 emissions. 
There is a strong interaction between these factors and the effects are therefore not additive. Hence, no 
estimate of their total impact is given. 
Box 3c: Under what circumstances would the Copenhagen Accord pledges lead to a peak in 
global emissions before 2020? 
Most of the emission pathways consistent with a likely chance of meeting the 2° C limit show emissions peaking 
before 2020 (see Chapter 2). Hence, peaking is an important indicator of whether pledges are consistent with 
the 2° C limit.
Making an assessment of whether global emissions peak between now and 2020 requires understanding of 
where the emissions will be in 2020, as well as their trajectory in the interval between now and then. If the 
emissions in 2020 are close to or below current levels, then it is possible that emissions will peak over this period. 
Estimates of current (2009) emission levels are around 48 GtCO2e (Manning et al. 2010). Since only the most 
ambitious of the pledge cases comes close to current levels, we expect that this pledge case is the one most 
likely to result in a peak in emissions before 2020. By contrast, the least ambitious pledge case (“unconditional 
pledges, lenient rules”) results in a strong increase in emissions and is therefore the least likely to peak before 
2020.
It should be noted that, it is also possible that emissions could peak before 2020, but still remain significantly 
above current levels in 2020. This could occur, for example, if the emission reduction policies are only introduced 
or start to take significant effect towards the end of this decade. However, it is difficult to assess the likelihood 
of this from the pledges alone. 
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4. What is the 
emissions gap? 
Lead authors: Michel den Elzen, Keywan Riahi
Contributing authors: William Hare, Niklas Höhne, 
Mikiko Kainuma, Jiang Kejun, Chris Taylor, Zhao 
Xiusheng
4.1 InTRODUCTIOn
This section assesses the potential “emissions gap” 
between expected emissions based on country pledges 
and emission levels in 2020 consistent with 2° C and 1.5° 
C limits. For this purpose, we build upon the results in 
chapters 2 and 3. 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the emission levels 
consistent with temperature limits depend on the 
desired likelihood of meeting particular limits, the 
feasible pace of emission reductions post 2020, and 
the availability of technology to achieve, for example, 
negative emissions (Chapter 2, Table 1). 
It was explained in Chapter 3 that expected emissions in 
2020 depend on whether unconditional or conditional 
pledges are followed and on the outcome of a number 
of issues under negotiation, in particular that of LULUCF 
accounting and surplus emission units (Chapter 3, Figure 
2). Given the uncertainty of both expected emissions 
and emission levels consistent with temperature limits, 
we do not make a single estimate of the potential gap. 
Instead, we assess the likely range of the gap based 
on combinations of assumptions about both expected 
emissions and emission levels corresponding to 
temperature targets53. 
4.2 FInDInGS FOR 2° C
Table 2 summarises the gaps that result from four 
different interpretations of how the pledges are 
followed, and for a “likely” (greater than 66 per cent) and 
a “medium” (50-66 per cent) chance of staying below 
2° C. 
In Chapter 2 it was shown that emission levels of 44 
GtCO2e in 2020 (range of 39-44 GtCO2e)
54 are consistent 
with a “likely” chance of limiting global warming to 2° C. 
53 However, it is important to note that the results in Chapter 2 do 
not take into account some other important sources of uncertainty, 
such as the effects in the future of different potential levels of 
anthropogenic aerosols—these may also affect the assessment of the 
gap.
54 As in previous chapters, this and following ranges refer to the 20th 
and 80th percentile of results, unless otherwise specified. 
In Chapter 3, four pledge cases or possible negotiation 
outcomes were identified. Here we compare the gap in 
2020 between expected emissions based on these cases 
and emission levels identified in Chapter 2. As a reference 
point, business-as-usual emissions in 2020 would result 
in a gap of 12 GtCO2e (range of 10-21 GtCO2e).
– Case 1 – “Unconditional pledges, lenient rules”. 
Countries implement their lower-ambition 
pledges and maximise the use of “lenient 
LULUCF credits”55 and surplus emissions units to 
meet their goals. In this case, the gap is 9 GtCO2e 
with a range of 8-18 GtCO2e. The unconditional 
pledges would thus reduce the gap by about 20 
per cent compared to business-as-usual. 
– Case 2 – “Unconditional pledges, strict rules”. 
Countries implement their lower-ambition 
pledges but do not use “lenient LULUCF credits” 
and surplus emission units to meet their goals. 
In this case, the gap narrows to 8 GtCO2e (range 
of 6-16 GtCO2e). Compared to business-as-
usual, this is equivalent to achieving about 30 
per cent of the overall mitigation effort towards 
2° C by 2020.
– Case 3 – “Conditional pledges, lenient rules”. 
Countries implement their higher-ambition 
pledges and make maximum use of “lenient 
LULUCF credits” and surplus emissions units. In 
this case, the gap is reduced to 7 GtCO2e (range 
of 5-14 GtCO2e). Compared to business-as-
usual, this is equivalent to achieving about 35 
per cent of the overall mitigation effort towards 
2° C by 2020.
– Case 4 – “Conditional pledges, strict rules”. 
Countries not only implement their higher-
ambition pledges, but also do not use “lenient 
LULUCF credits” and surplus emission units 
to meet their goals. The result is a further 
narrowing of the gap to 5 GtCO2e (range of 
3-12 GtCO2e). This corresponds to the smallest 
gap assessed in Table 2, and is equivalent to 
reducing the overall mitigation effort towards 2° 
C by almost 60 per cent compared to business-
as-usual in 2020. As a point of reference, the 
remaining gap is about the level of emissions in 
the European Union in 2005 or from the world’s 
road transport in that same year. 
Hence, moving from (lower-ambition) unconditional 
pledges to (higher-ambition) conditional pledges 
narrows the gap by about 2 to 3 GtCO2e—the majority 
of this reduction would come from industrialized countr 
ies, whose pledges are sometimes conditional on the 
ambitious action of other countries or on domestic 
55 Credits given for carbon removals from existing forests or other 
sinks that would have occurred without policy intervention and are 
likely to be included in the baseline of models. 
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legislation. A smaller, but still important, part of the 
reduction would come from developing countries, 
whose pledges are sometimes conditional on the 
adequate provision of international climate finance or 
technology transfer. 
In addition, the gap can be reduced by around 1 to 
2 GtCO2e by ensuring that “strict” rules apply to the 
use of LULUCF credits and surplus emission units. If 
industrialized countries apply “strict” accounting rules 
to minimise the use of what we refer to as “lenient 
LULUCF credits”, they would strengthen the effect of 
their pledges and thus reduce the emissions gap by up 
to 0.8 GtCO2e. Likewise, if the rules governing the use of 
surplus emission units under the Kyoto Protocol were 
designed in a way that would avoid the weakening of 
mitigation targets, the gap could be reduced by up to 
2.3 GtCO2e. These include units carried over from the 
current commitment period and any potential new 
surpluses created in the next. See Chapter 3 for more 
details56.
There are also a number of important factors, mentioned 
in Chapter 3, that could increase or decrease the gap and 
that are not included in these cases. The double counting 
of international offsets towards both industrialized and 
developing countries’ goals could reduce the overall 
amount of mitigation and thus increase the gap by up to 
1.3 GtCO2e. Conversely, the implementation of ambitious 
existing national plans, beyond what is included in the 
Copenhagen Accord, could narrow the gap by up to 1.5 
GtCO2e (as compared to the fourth pledge case). 
To have a “medium” rather than a “likely” chance of staying 
below 2° C, the emission levels for the pledge cases can 
be about 1 GtCO2e higher, and the corresponding gap 1 
GtCO2e lower for all pledge cases (Table 2).
Explanation of the range of results of the 
emissions gap for 2° C
The range of the gap presented for the different cases 
in Table 2 is based on the “majority of results” (20th to 
80th percentile) across both the pledges and the 2° C 
emission levels. The upper bound estimate of the gap 
combines low 2° C emission levels (20th percentile) 
with high emissions from pledges (80th percentile). As 
explained in Chapter 2, emission levels consistent with 
the 2° C limit tend to be lower in 2020 when followed 
by comparatively slower emission reduction rates 
thereafter, or when negative emissions are not achieved 
over the long run. 
56 Note that the 0.8 and 2.3 GtCO2e numbers indicate the maximum 
possible impact expected from these issues and cannot simply be 
added together. The median impact of moving from “lenient” to 
“strict” accounting rules is found to be 1-2 GtCO2e. See Chapter 3 for 
more details. 
Conversely, at the low end of the gap range we find a 
combination of higher 2° C emission levels in 2020 
and low expected emissions as a result of the pledges. 
Emission levels that are consistent with 2° C tend to be 
higher in 2020 when reduction rates are comparatively 
high after 2020 (3.1 per cent per year) and/or it is 
assumed that negative emissions take effect over the 
long run. Under these conditions, emissions can afford 
to be higher in 2020, since they will be reduced more 
quickly afterwards. 
The size of the gap is therefore strongly dependent 
on expectations about emission reduction rates after 
2020 and the prospects for negative emissions later 
in the century. Both depend, of course, on the rate of 
technological development. 
In addition, the reader will note that the range around 
median estimates is not symmetric; the lower bound 
extends by about 1-2 GtCO2e below the median, 
whereas the upper bound rises 7-9 GtCO2e above it (for 
a “likely” chance). This is found for all the pledge cases 
examined and arises because of the skewed distribution 
of pledge estimates with a more pronounced tail on the 
upper bound. One interpretation of this skewed range is 
that the gap may in reality tend to be on the higher side 
of the median.
This chapter has so far focused on the “majority of results” 
(20th to 80th percentile of estimates). Results outside this 
range indicate that emission levels for a “likely” chance 
of staying below 2° C could be as high as 48 GtCO2e 
(Chapter 2), while at the same time expected emissions 
under case 4 (“conditional pledges, strict rules”) could, 
according to one estimate, be as low as 45 GtCO2e in 
2020. Under these conditions, no gap exists. On the 
other hand, looking at the other end of the range, we 
find 2° C emission levels for a “likely” chance of staying 
below the 2° C limit can range as low as 26 GtCO2e, while 
the highest estimate of emissions under case 1 of the 
pledge cases (“unconditional pledges, lenient rules”) is 
61 GtCO2e, resulting in a gap as high as 35 GtCO2e.
4.3 FInDInGS FOR 1.5° C
There is no emission pathway in the assessed IAM 
literature of Chapter 2 that achieves the 1.5° C limit with 
a “likely” (greater than 66 per cent) chance and only one 
study in this literature depicts an emission pathway 
consistent with a medium (50-66 per cent) chance of 
meeting the 1.5° C limit (Magné et al. 2010). The IAM 
pathways assessed that meet the 2° C limit with a “likely” 
chance suggest, however, that after a small (0.1-0.2° C) 
transient overshoot of the 1.5° C target, the temperature 
increase by the end of the twenty-first century could 
drop below 1.5° C, but with a lower probability. These 
pathways reach the 1.5° C target in the long-term with 
a median probability of 30 per cent (range of 27-35 per 




2020 emissions: 56 [54-60])
12 [10-21] 11 [8-18]
Unconditional pledge, Lenient rules
(2020 emissions: 53 [52-57])
9 [8-18] 8 [6-15]
Unconditional pledge, Strict rules
(2020 emissions: 52 [50-55])
8 [6-16] 7 [4-13]
Conditional pledge, Lenient rules
(2020 emissions: 51 [49-53])
7 [5-14] 6 [3-11]
Conditional pledge, Strict rules
(2020 emissions: 49 [47-51])
5 [3-12] 4 [1-9]
(2020 emissions: 44 [39-44]) (2020 emissions: 45 [42-46])
"Likely" chance (>66%) to 
stay below 2°C
"Medium" chance (50 to 
66%) to stay below 2°C
cent). Reaching 1.5° C with these lower probabilities 
would thus leave a similar emissions gap in 2020 as 
the one for a “likely” chance for 2° C. However, having 
a “likely” chance of reaching the 1.5° C target would 
require higher rates of emission reductions after 2020 
(and correspondingly high rates of technological 
development and deployment) than those reported in 
the IAM literature.
4.4 COnCLUSIOnS 
We have seen in this chapter that a global emissions gap 
is likely between expected emissions as a result of the 
pledges and emission levels consistent with the 2° C limit 
in 2020. But our analysis of options for implementing the 
Copenhagen Accord pledges has also shown that this 
gap could be narrowed through any of the following 
policy options57:
57 Note that options 1 and 2 are non-additive as their impact depends 
on the order in which they are implemented. We find that the median 
impact of these two options together is 4 GtCO2e in 2020 (shown by 
moving from the “unconditional pledges, lenient rules” case to the 
“conditional pledges, strict rules” case) with a 20th to 80th percentile 
range across groups of 4-6 GtCO2e
1. Implement conditional pledges: If all countries were 
to move to their conditional (high ambition) pledges, 
it would significantly narrow the 2020 emissions gap 
towards 2° C. The gap would be reduced by about 2 
to 3 GtCO2e, with most of the emission reductions 
coming from industrialized countries and a smaller, but 
important, share coming from developing countries. 
This would require that conditions on those pledges 
be fulfilled. These conditions include expected actions 
of other countries as well as the provision of adequate 
financing, technology transfer and capacity building. 
Alternatively it would imply that conditions are relaxed 
or removed.
2. Minimise the use of “lenient LULUCF credits” and surplus 
emission units: If industrialized countries applied strict 
accounting rules to minimise the use of “lenient LULUCF 
credits” and avoided the use of surplus emissions units 
for meeting their targets, they would strengthen the 
effect of their pledges and thus reduce the emissions 
gap in 2020 by about 1 to 2 GtCO2e (with up to 0.8 
GtCO2e coming from LULUCF accounting and up to 2.3 
GtCO2e from surplus emissions units).
Table 2. The global gap (in GtCO2e per year) between emission levels for staying below 2° C (with a 
“likely” (greater than 66 per cent) and a “medium” (50-66 per cent) chance) and expected emissions 
as a result of the Copenhagen Accord pledges. All estimates in this table are derived from the results of 
chapters 2 and 3. Values in bold correspond to medians, and numbers in brackets correspond to 20th to 80th 
percentile of estimates. Numbers in italics give the adjusted 2020 emission levels for expected emissions from 
the pledges and emission levels from the pathways.
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3. Avoid double-counting of offsets: Double-counting of 
offsets could lead to an increase of the gap of up to 1.3 
GtCO2e, depending on whether countries implement 
their unconditional or conditional pledges (there is likely 
to be greater demand for offsets in the higher-ambition, 
conditional case). Hence avoiding double-counting 
could be an important policy option.
4. Implement measures beyond current pledges: The 
scenarios assessed in Chapter 2 indicate that it is 
technically possible to reduce emissions beyond present 
national plans in 2020. These scenarios show that the gap 
could be closed, and that emission levels consistent with 
2° C could be achieved through the implementation of a 
wide portfolio of mitigation measures, including energy 
efficiency and conservation, renewables, nuclear, carbon 
capture and storage, non-CO2 emissions mitigation, 
hydro-electric power, afforestation and avoided 
deforestation.
5. Lay the groundwork for faster emission reduction 
rates after 2020: Emission pathway consistent with a 2º 
C  temperature limit are charactized by rapid rates of 
emission reduction post 2020 (of greater than 2.2 per 
cent per year). Such reduction rates on a sustained time-
scale would be unprecedented historically. Therefore 
it is critical to lay the groundwork now for faster post 
2020 emission reductions, for example, by avoiding 
lock-in of high-carbon infrastructure with long lifespans, 
or by developing and demonstrating advanced clean 
technologies.
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5.1 InTRODUCTIOn 
In the previous chapter (Chapter 4), it has been shown 
that, in the majority of cases, there is a gap between the 
2020 emission levels expected as a result of the current 
pledges and the emission levels that would be consistent 
with either a 2° C or 1.5° C limit. For a “likely” chance of 
meeting the 2° C limit, the size of the gap can range 
between 5 and 9 GtCO2e depending on the pledge case 
under consideration. 
There is also widespread interest in the implications 
of 2020 pledges for long-term temperature change. 
Because future temperature increase is highly dependent 
upon cumulative emissions after 2020, it is not possible 
to link unambiguously current pledges with a future 
temperature outcome or likelihood without making 
assumptions about post 2020 emission levels. However, it 
is possible to compare 2020 emissions with IAM scenarios 
associated with different levels of future warming. Each 
of these IAM scenarios result in an emission pathway 
consistent with assumptions about technological and 
economic development. These emission pathways then 
lead to different levels of temperature increase in the 
twenty-first century. Superposition of the 2020 pledge 
estimates on the IAM pathways provides insight into 
possible long term temperature trends consistent with 
the pledges. 
5.2 PLEDGES In 2020 AnD TWEnTy-FIRST 
CEnTURy TEMPERATURES
In Figure 4, a set of 126 IAM emission pathways (see 
Box 2a) have been assembled that give rise to a range 
of likely future temperatures from below 2° C to more 
than 5° C. Since the emission pathways have all been 
generated by IAM models, the rates of decline in annual 
emissions in each of these scenarios are constrained 
by assumptions about technological and/or economic 
feasibility embedded in these models. Superimposed on 
these pathways is a bar representing the range of 2020 
expected emissions derived from the pledge cases in 
Chapter 3.
Figure 4 shows that the range of 2020 emission levels 
resulting from the pledges tends to be consistent 
with the IAM pathways that have a likely temperature 
increase ranging from 2.5° to 5° C. This is consistent with 
the findings in chapters 2, 3 and 4. This broad range 
of temperatures results from a variety of assumptions 
about post 2020 policy, technological and economic 
development. 
As discussed in previous chapters, this does not mean 
that current pledges preclude meeting the 2° C limit. 
However, achieving this goal from the level of emissions 
resulting from the pledges would involve faster rates of 
decline, or greater negative emissions than included in 
most of the scenarios in Chapter 2. This could involve 
factors not assumed in the IAM scenarios considered in 
this report such as development of new technologies or 
higher economic expenditures. 
One clear implication of Figure 4 is that a “likely” chance 
of meeting a 2° C or 1.5° C limit will require attention to 
two factors: 
•	 Implementing	 and	 strengthening	 2020	
emissions pledges: Implementation of the 
“conditional pledges, strict rules” case would bring 
emissions in 2020 to about 49 GtCO2e (range of 47-
51 GtCO2e) compared with the 44 GtCO2e (range 
of 39-44 GtCO2e) that would give a “likely” chance 
of meeting the 2° C limit. Hence, strengthening 
the pledges would be needed in order to close 
the gap when considering the majority of results. 
•	 Laying	the	policy	and	investment	groundwork	
for faster and deeper reductions in post 
2020 emissions: Since all the pathways that 
have a “likely” chance of achieving temperature 
limits show strong declines in emissions after 
2020 it will be important to achieve faster 
and deeper emission reductions post 2020. 
These conclusions also hold for a “medium” chance of 
meeting the 2° C limit. 
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Figure 4: Temperature increases 
associated with emission pathways and 
compared to the expected emissions 
from the pledges
(a) Coloured bands show IAM emission 
pathways over the twenty-first century. The 
pathways were grouped based on ranges 
of “likely” avoided temperature increase in 
the twenty-first century. Emission corridors 
were defined by, at each year, identifying 
the 20th to 80th percentile range of 
emissions and drawing the corresponding 
coloured bands across the range. Wide gaps 
are visible between the coloured bands 
because most of these scenarios aim for 
low greenhouse gas emission targets and 
because only the 20th to 80th percentile 
of results are shown. The small black 
bar represents the range of the median 
estimates of the pledge cases from Chapter 
3 in 2020. The thin blue bar represents 
the range from the 80th percentile of the 
“unconditional pledges, lenient rules” case 
to the 20th percentile of the “conditional 
pledges, strict rules” case. 
(b) The coloured bars on the left hand side 
of this panel show the range (20th to 80th 
percentile) of 2020 emission levels from 
the IAM pathways consistent with a “likely” 
chance of avoiding different temperature 
increases—as shown in panel (a). The right 
hand side of panel (b) compares these 
emissions corridors with the 20th to 80th 
percentile ranges of expected emissions 
resulting from the four pledge cases 
developed in Chapter 3.
5.3 COnCLUSIOnS
The majority of results in this report show that emissions 
in 2020 expected from the Copenhagen Accord pledges 
are higher than emission levels consistent with a 
“medium” or “likely” chance of staying below 2° C and 
1.5° C. At the same time they also show that the range 
of 2020 emission levels from the Copenhagen Accord 
pledges tends to be consistent with the IAM pathways 
that have “likely” temperature increases of 2.5° C to 5° C 
up to the end of the twenty-first century.
However, this does not mean that a 2° C goal is infeasible. 
The IAM literature shows that it remains possible to meet 
the temperature limits reviewed here, but the emission 
reduction rates required post 2020 are at the high end 
of what is currently assumed in the IAM literature to 
be technologically and economically feasible. The IAM 
literature also shows that options might be limited after 
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temperature increases expected emissions
have to be available and broad participation in global 
efforts to reduce emissions would be needed (Calvin 
et al. 2009, Clarke et al. 2009, Krey and Riahi 2009, van 
Vliet et al. 2009). Pathways capable of meeting the 2° 
C and 1.5° C limits require significant effort to develop 
technologies for achieving negative CO2 emissions from 
energy and industry starting shortly after mid-century.
Commencing with such fast rates of emission reduction 
in 2020 and maintaining them for decades will require 
significant changes in underlying infrastructure and 
policy. Thus, if it is desired to meet temperature targets, 
two things appear to be required: first, countries would 
have to increase the ambition of their 2020 pledges; 
and second, society would have to put in place the 
policy, research, and investment processes to support 
and sustain such a rapid decline in emissions. Rapid 
rates of emission reduction will also require sustained 
global effort and cooperation, since action by only a 
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small subset of countries will not be enough to reach 
temperature targets (Calvin et al. 2009, Clarke et al. 2009, 
Clarke and Weyant 2009, Krey and Riahi 2009, van Vliet 
et al. 2009). 
In order to bring emissions in line with IAM pathways that 
meet a 2° C limit, there is a need to not only implement 
current pledges fully, but also to raise the ambition of 
those pledges and lay the groundwork for faster and 
deeper reductions of post 2020 emissions. Going further 
in the short term and achieving stronger cuts to lower 
levels in 2020 would leave open more possibilities to 
meet temperature limits and would allow more flexibility 
in choosing a post 2020 pathway for global emissions.
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